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Abstract
Empirical Analysis and Automated Classification of Security Bug Reports
Jacob P. Tyo
With the ever expanding amount of sensitive data being placed into computer systems,
the need for effective cybersecurity is of utmost importance. However, there is a shortage
of detailed empirical studies of security vulnerabilities from which cybersecurity metrics and
best practices could be determined. This thesis has two main research goals: (1) to explore
the distribution and characteristics of security vulnerabilities based on the information pro-
vided in bug tracking systems and (2) to develop data analytics approaches for automatic
classification of bug reports as security or non-security related. This work is based on using
three NASA datasets as case studies. The empirical analysis showed that the majority of
software vulnerabilities belong only to a small number of types. Addressing these types of
vulnerabilities will consequently lead to cost efficient improvement of software security. Since
this analysis requires labeling of each bug report in the bug tracking system, we explored
using machine learning to automate the classification of each bug report as a security or
non-security related (two-class classification), as well as each security related bug report as
specific security type (multiclass classification). In addition to using supervised machine
learning algorithms, a novel unsupervised machine learning approach is proposed. Of the
machine learning algorithms tested, Naive Bayes was the most consistent, well performing
classifier across all datasets. The novel unsupervised approach did not perform as well as the
supervised methods, but still performed well resulting in a G-Score of 0.715 in the case of
best performance whereas the supervised approach achieved a G-Score of 0.903 in the case
of best performance.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The awareness of hacking has risen significantly in recent years due to both an increase
in the amount of hacking related media available, and to the seemingly endless attacks
plaguing news headlines. The consequences of falling victim to one of these increasing
number of attacks has caused a significant shift in software validation, verification, and
security monitoring. Security is increasingly becoming part of the software development
life cycle. This thesis has two main research goals: (1) to explore the distribution and
characteristics of security vulnerabilities based on the information provided in bug tracking
systems and (2) to develop data analytics approaches for automatic classification of bug
reports as security or non-security related.
This work uses three NASA datasets extracted from issue tracking systems. Two of the
datasets used in this thesis are from the same NASA flight mission, with one originating
from the developers of that system and the other originating from the IV&V analysts. The
remaining dataset originates from an IV&V analysis of a NASA ground mission.
Chapter 3 of this thesis focuses on analyzing the data extracted from bug tracking systems
to develop vulnerability profiles, which provide an empirical view of a software security
vulnerabilities. This allows for analysts and developers to examine the most common security
flaws, as well as the most vulnerable components and subsystems found in their systems.
Furthermore, this information can be used to enhance the education of the developers of
these systems to eliminate similar issues in the future.
Creating a vulnerability profile of a project using information extracted from a bug track-
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ing system requires that each issue is labeled with a tag describing its security effects, flaws,
or type. This information was partially present in one dataset, and non-existent in the
others. Assigning these labels is very labor intensive, time consuming, and requires signifi-
cant security specific knowledge. To alleviate this burden, Chapter 4 focuses on developing
machine learning approaches capable of automatically assigning each bug report with its
corresponding security tag. This includes classifying each bug report as security related or
not, as well as classifying each issue as a specific vulnerability type.
Supervised approaches to automating the classification of issues requires manual labeling
which is time consuming and costly. In an attempt to avoid this requirement, a novel
unsupervised learning approach was developed.
1.1 Key Terms
This thesis relies on terminology specific to the security field, as well as defines some
terms to simplify certain explanations. These terms are addressed in this section:
A failure is a departure of the system or system component behavior from its required
behavior.
A fault is an accidental condition, which if encountered, may cause the system or system
component to fail to perform as required. Bug is typically used as a synonym for fault.
Bug reports (also referred to as issues) are accounts of faults and failures. Bug reports
can cover an extreme variety of topics, and are used to detail, find, and fix such system
problems.
Developer Change Requests (DCRs) are requests to change or update the system’s
functionality, or to request a fix for software bugs. These are located in any bug tracking
system originating from developers. For the NASA mission containing such requests, each
DCR was labeled with a subtype such as “Defect” or “Change Request” which allows for
extraction of only DCRs that are bug reports.
Bug tracking systems (sometimes referred to as issue tracking systems) are software
programs that manage and maintain lists of issues as needed by an organization. Many types
of these systems exists, yet the type of system is irrelevant for this research.
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A vulnerability (also referred to as a security issue) is a security flaw, glitch, or
weakness found in software that can lead to gaps in the systems security, and potentially be
exploited by an attacker.
A vulnerability profile is an empirical view of software security vulnerabilities. The
vulnerability profile of each project includes the most common types of vulnerabilities in the
system, the most vulnerable components, where most vulnerabilities are found, and more.
CWE refers to Common Weakness Enumeration, which is a formal list of software weak-
ness types aimed at serving as a common language for describing software security weaknesses
in architecture, design, or code. This work will refer both to the total listing (CWE list) as
well as individual elements within the list (CWE).
A CWE View is a particular perspective (or view) from which to look at the CWE list.
Each view can organize, categorize, or group each individual CWE’s within the overall list
differently.
CVE stands for Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. CVE is a dictionary of common
names for publicly known cyber security vulnerabilities and exposures.
NVD (National Vulnerability Database) is the U.S. government repository of standards
based vulnerability management data represented using the Security Content Automation
Protocol. NVD includes databases of security checklists, security related software flaws,
misconfigurations, product names, and impact metrics.
CVSS is the Common Vulnerability Scoring System which is an open framework for com-
municating the characteristics and severity of software vulnerabilities. This scoring system
takes into account properties of vulnerabilities such as the impact it would have if exploited,
as well as the ease of exploiting the vulnerability.
1.2 Research Questions and Contributions
This work explores the following research questions:
1. What are the dominant types of vulnerabilities in NASA ground and flight software
systems?
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(a) Are they consistent across projects and project types?
2. Can supervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify software issues as
security related or not?
(a) Do some learners perform consistently better than others?
(b) How much data must be set aside for training in order to produce accurate clas-
sification results?
3. Can supervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify security issues to spe-
cific security classes?
(a) Are some classes harder to predict than others?
4. Can unsupervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify software issues as
security related or not?
5. How does the performance of supervised and unsupervised machine learning algorithms
compare when classifying software bug reports?
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
We developed a vulnerability profile for thee NASA datasets, which include over 1,800 bug
reports. The most common security flaws in each dataset were determined, and those which
were consistent across the different datasets were identified. Software faults and failures in
open source and NASA missions have been previously studied [1], [2], [3], but not specifically
vulnerabilities.
Supervised machine learning algorithms were used to classify each bug report as security
related or not (two-class problem), based only on the information found in a bug tracking
system. Several efforts have been done [4], [5], [6], and [7], which focused on separating
security from non-security bug reports: [4], [5], and [6] automated this process achieving
moderate performance. Furthermore, all approaches were only focused on classification to
security and non-security bug reports.
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Supervised machine learning algorithms were used to classify each bug report to a spe-
cific security class (multiclass classification), based only on the information found in a bug
tracking system. Wang et al used machine learning techniques to classify vulnerabilities as
a CVE type [8]. However, the features used for classification were the CVSS scores of the
vulnerability.
An unsupervised machine learning approach was developed to classify bug reports as
security related or not. This approach uses a one class problem and incorporating the CWE
list. It appears that no prior work using unsupervised machine learning to classify software
security bug reports exists.
6Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter presents the related work to the vulnerability profile and the automated
security bug classification system.
2.1 Vulnerability Profile
The information housed within an issue tracking system contains valuable information
for quantifying traits of a software system such as how error prone it is, how well-kept it is,
and how secure the system is. Empirical studies of the information found in issue tracking
systems can be used for things ranging from determining the most error prone aspects of a
system to detecting how the system could be improved. While little research that leverages
an issue tracking system in an empirical way was found, the following papers are highly
related to such a situation.
Fenton et al. empirically studied a large software-intensive telecommunication application
from Ericsson Telecom AB [9]. This work was focused on a range of software engineering
hypotheses related to the Pareto principle of distribution of faults and failures, the use of
early fault data to predict later fault and failure data, metrics for fault prediction, and
benchmarking fault data. The results included strong evidence that a small number of
modules contain most of the faults discovered in prerelease testing and that a very small
number of modules contain most of the faults discovered in Operation. However, the fault-
prone modules was not explained by its size or complexity. While showing that the number
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of faults discovered in prerelease testing is an order of magnitude greater than the number
discovered in 12 months of operational use, they also discovered fairly stable numbers of
faults discovered at corresonding testing phases. The most surprising result was related to
the counter-intuitive relationship between pre- and postrelease faults. In other words, the
modules that were the most fault-prone prerelease were among the the least fault-prone
postrelease, as well as vice versa.
Hamill et al. explored the localization of faults that lead to individual software failures
and the distribution of different types of software faults in a mature NASA mission and the C
preprocessor of GCC [3]. It was shown that individual failures are often caused by multiple
faults spread throughout the system, which indicates that finding and fixing faults that
lead to such software failures in large, complex systems are often difficult and challenging
tasks despite the advances in software development. While showing that the most common
types of software faults are requirement faults, coding faults, and data problems, they also
showed that a significant percentage of failures are linked to late life cycle activities, which
is contrary to popular belief. Comparing the trends across software systems, Hamill et al.
suggested that these trends were likely to be intrinsic characteristics of software faults and
failures rather than project specific.
Hamill et al. focused on empirically characterizing software fixes [2] based on their
previous work [3]. Based on a safety-critical NASA mission containing 21 large-scale software
components, a link was established from software faults to failures and consequently to fixes
made to correct these faults. The results showed that a significant number of software failures
required fixes in multiple software components and/or multiple software artifacts (i.e.,15%
and 26% respectively). Furthermore, the patterns of software components fixed together
were significantly affected by the software architecture. The types of fixed software artifacts
were highly correlated with the fault type, and they had different distributions for pre-release
and post-release failures.
Hamill et al. studied the types of faults that caused software failures, activities taking
place when faults were detected or failures were reported, and the severity of failures [1]
which builds on their previous works [2] and [3]. They explored the associations among
these attributes and the trends within and across releases. Results showed that only a
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few fault types were responsible for the majority of failures pre-release, post-release, and
across releases. The distributions of fault types were different for pre-release and post-release
failures, and the percentage of safety-critical failures was small overall. All failures were more
heavily associated with coding faults than with any other type of fault, while components
that experienced a high number of failures in one release were not necessarily among high
failure components in the subsequent release. Lastly, components that experienced more
failures pre-release were more likely to fail post-release.
With the increasing popularity, capability, and the release of open source OSes for hand-
held devices, Maji et al. utilized bug reports, bug fixes, developer reports, and failure
reports to look into the manifestation of failures in different modules of Android and their
characteristics [10]. These reports were viewed from the standpoint of the frequency of
failures, and the persistence of the issue. This study showed that most of the bugs (over
90%) were permanent in nature, the kernel layer was sufficiently robust yet much effort was
needed to improve the middleware layer. Furthermore, between 11% and 50% of bugs were
a result of the customizability Android offered to the developers, and most bugs required
only minor changes for correction (etc. update configuration parameters).
Grottke et al. [11] analyzed the faults discovered in the on-board software for 18
JPL/NASA space missions, pointing out that the ability to effectively deal with faults is
increasingly important as space mission software becomes more complex. The authors de-
fined Bohrbugs as bugs that are easily isolated and removed during software testing, and
Mandelbugs as bugs that appear to behave chaotically. This paper explored the proportions
of Bohrbugs and Mandelbugs and studies how they evolved over time, after manually clas-
sifying each bug as either a Bohrbug or a Mandelbug. Furthermore, they examined whether
or not the fault type and attributes such as the failure effect are independent. A set of 520
anomalies was derived, each of which represent a unique fault in the flight software of 18
JPL/NASA missions. Grottke et al. determined that there is a highly significant relationship
between the fault type and the failure risk, and 61.4% of bugs were Bohrbugs, and 36.5%
were Mandelbugs.
Frattini et al. presented an analysis of 146 bug reports from Apache Virtual Computing
Lab, which they determined to be a representative open source Cloud platform [12]. This
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analysis identified the components where bugs were likely to be found in future releases,
the phases of the service life cycle during which such bugs may be discovered, and the
modification required to solve them. This paper was based on a small dataset, but the
results included useful information which could be used to create guidelines and increase
efforts in areas in which the system under concern is weakest.
Alonso et al. [13] analyzed the mitigation’s associated with each fault defined in their
previous work [11], [14]. Trends of mitigation type proportions within missions as well as
from mission to mission were identified, while looking for relationships between fault types
and mitigation types. This paper showed that the Bohrbugs and Mandelbugs discussed
in [11] are most frequently mitigated via fixes instead of other measures such as proactive
reboots, and for each type of fault, the earlier missions tended to show lower frequencies of
fixes/patches than the more recent missions.
Xia et al. utilized the bug databases and code repositories for the build systems Ant,
Maven, CMake, and QMake containing 199, 250, 200, and 151 bug reports respectively
[15]. Each sample was manually classified into various categories for further analysis. These
categories were very general. The results showed that 21.35% of bugs belonged to the
external interface category, 18.23% belonged to the logic category, and 12.86% belonged to
the configuration category.
Alhazmi et al. examined the feasibility of quantitatively characterizing some aspects of
security [16]. Specifically, they investigated if it is possible to predict the number of vulner-
abilities that can potentially be present in a software system, but may not have been found
yet. The density of vulnerabilities, fraction of software defects that are security related,
the dynamics of vulnerability discovery, and the vulnerability discovery rate were used to
estimate the magnitude of the undiscovered vulnerabilities still present in the system. The
analysis was based on both commercial and open-source systems to determine the general-
izability. The results revealed that the vulnerability densities fall within a range of values,
similar to fault density for general faults. The authors claimed that it is possible to model
the vulnerability discovery using a logistic model, which can sometimes be approximated by
a linear model as a function of time.
Venter et al. focused on the problem in which each vulnerability scanner represents,
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identifies, and classifies vulnerabilities in its own way [17]. A vulnerability scanner is a
proactive information security technology which searches systems and networks for the oc-
currence of known flaws and then produces a report that an individual or Enterprise can
use to strengthen its security. A static code analysis tool is a type of vulnerability scanner.
Each scanner’s report is different, therefore scanners are difficult to compare. Often times
multiple scanners are ran on the same system to catch as many vulnerabiities as possible,
yet it is difficult to aggregate the results appropriately. This paper outlines an approach
towards achieving a standardized vulnerability category set via a data-clustering algorithm,
which was done with self-organizing maps (SOMs) and data pulled from CVE’s. While no
quantification of the results was provided, this paper showed the importance and benefits of
having a standardized vulnerability categorization set.
The Sourcefire Vulnerability Research Team (Younan et al.) took a historical look at
vulnerabilities reported from 1998 to 2012 [18]. This vulnerability analysis was based on
frequency analysis of the CVE’s in the NVD databases. Younan et al. were able to lever-
age this data to draw several interesting conclusions, one of which being that despite the
progress in mitigating attacks against buffer overflows, they remain one of the top ranking
vulnerabilities year over year. Furthermore, they showed that while fewer vulnerabilities
were reported in the last couple of years, the percentage of more critical vulnerabilities has
increased. Some surprising conclusions include that Microsoft has significantly improved
within the last couple of years and their browser and mobile operating systems are better
than their competitors’ in terms of vulnerabilities discovered. Furthermore, Chrome ranked
as one of the highest for vulnerabilities, while Android had very few; iOS had a significant
lead in number of vulnerabilities, while Safari had the fewest compared to the other browsers.
2.2 Automated Bug Report Classification
Issue tracking systems contain unstructured text, and therefore text mining can be used
to automatically process data from such systems. This section discusses previous work
that uses the issues available in issue tracking systems to perform some type of automatic
classification.
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Hovsepyan et al. approached static code analysis from the perspective of raw text,
i.e. treated the source code as a text document [19]. Their text mining and classification
approach used consisted of creating the feature vectors which contained the term frequencies
and Support Vector Machine (SVM) to classify which files contain vulnerabilities. The
dataset used in this work was the source code for the K9 mail client for Android mobile
device applications, and labeled with Fortify [20]. Fortify is a static code analysis tool which
does not detect 100% of vulnerabilities and is known to have a very high false positive rate.
Because this was used to label the data, the performance metrics reported are compared to
these labels and not the true class of the data meaning that the reported accuracy of 0.87,
precision of 0.85 and recall of 0.88 mean almost nothing in terms of true performance, only
that this method performs similar to Fortify.
Scandariato et al. took an approach very similar to that mentioned in [19] by also us-
ing project source code as text for text mining approaches [21]. Specifically, they aimed to
determine which components of a project are likely to contain vulnerabilities using term fre-
quencies along with either Naive Bayes or Random Forest. After validation with 20 Android
application, they determined that a dependable prediction model can be built (precision be-
tween 62% and 100% and recall between 48% and 100%), which could be useful in prioritizing
the validation activities.
Perl et al. approached the increasing level of software vulnerabilities from a perspective
yet to be mentioned, through Vulnerability Contributing Commits (VCC) within version
control systems [22]. A large scale mapping was created between CVE’s and the commits
leading to them to create a vulnerable commit database. Based on that database, an SVM
classifier was used to flag suspicious commits. 66 projects that used either C or C++
programming language as well as the Git version control system were used for the analysis.
During testing, the danger level of a piece of code was determined by the danger level of the
commit. The authors stated that compared to Flawfinder [23], their method cut the number
of false positives in half, while maintaining a recall between 26% and 48% and precision
between 11% and 56%.
Jalbert et al. [24] proposed a system that automatically classifies duplicate bug reports
as they arrive, using surface features, textual semantics, and graph clustering. Titles and
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descriptions were used from the bug reports, however the authors argued that combining
them would result in a loss of information and are therefore kept as separate corpora. A
“bag of words” approach was used when defining similarly between the textual data, or in
other words the cosine similarity was computed between the term frequency vectors of each
issue. To account for weighting of features, it is argued that the popular Term Frequency /
Inverse Document Frequency (TF/IDF) would not provide effective results, therefore they
developed their own logarithmic weight algorithm based solely on the number of occurrences
of a term in a document. The dataset consisted of 29,000 bug reports from the Mozilla
project. The results showed that the created system was capable of filtering out only a small
portion (8%) of duplicate bug reports.
Lamkanfi et al. demonstrated that text mining can predict the severity of a given bug
report with a reasonable accuracy given a training set of sufficient size [25]. In this paper four
well-known text mining algorithms were compared (Naive Bayes, Naive Bayes Multinomial,
K-Nearest Neighbor and Support Vector Machine). Three research questions were explored:
“What classification algorithm should we use when predicting bug report severity?”, “How
many bug reports are necessary when training a classifier in order to have reliable predic-
tions?”, and “What can be deduced from the resulting classification algorithms?” The results
showed that the Naive Bayes Multinomial classifier had the best accuracy (as measured by
ROC) and was also the fastest when classifying the severity of reported bugs. The Naive
Bayes and Naive Bayes Multinomial classifiers are able to achieve stable accuracy the fastest,
needing about 250 bugs for training.
Antoniol et al. investigated whether the text of the issues posted in bug tracking systems
is enough to classify them into corrective maintenance and other kinds of activities [26]. The
Eclipse, Mozilla, and JBoss open soure systems were the selected datasets, with the title,
description and discussing being used to build the feature vector. Although a lot of focus was
placed on automating this process, it was also shown that the information contained in issues
posted on bug tracking system can be indeed used to classify such issues, distinguishing bugs
from other activities, with a precision between 64% and 98% and a recall between 33% and
97% and accuracy as high as 82%.
Chawla et al. attempted to classify an issue as either a bug or other request using a fuzzy
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logic approach [27]. The typical text preprocessing steps were applied, and three open source
software systems were used as case studies: HTTPClient, Jackrabbit, and Lucene. A custom
feature extraction process was used, yet it was very similar to the common TF-IDF method,
followed by 5 fold cross validation for separation of the data into training and testing sets.
The fuzzy logic approach worked marginally better than other classification methods such as
Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression, and AD Tree, and achieved accuracies of 87%, 84%, and
91% and recalls of 77%, 78%, and 85% on the three projects respectively.
Ahmed et al. pointed out the need for dependable bug categorization in order to better
handle proper solution [28]. Their paper analyzes the automatic prediction of different bug
types (Function, Logic, Standard, and GUI) using K Nearest Neighbor and Naive Bayes.
After using 10 fold cross validation, they report recall and precision respectively 91% and
75% for standard issues, 79% and 75% for function issues, 79% and 73% for user interface
issues, and 72% an 79% for logic issues respectively.
Somasundaram et al. investigated automatically categorizing bug reports to allow for
the assignment of a bug to the proper development team through the use of TF-IDF with an
SVM classifier (SVM-TF-IDF), LDA with SVM (SVM-LDA), and LDA and KL (LDA-KL,
Kullback Leiber divergence) [29]. Kullback Leiver divergence is an approach which classifies
bug reports by measuring the divergence between each topic’s centroids obtained from LDA
and a test bug. After testing on the Eclipse, Mylyn, and Mozilla datasets, LDA-KL produced
recalls of 86%, 77%, and 82% on the three project respectively. These results were similar
to those found previously but with better consistency across all components for which bugs
must be categorized.
Layman et al. applied topic modeling to a corpus of NASA problem reports to extract
trends in testing and operational failures, where problem reports are records of off-nominal
performance, deviations from design, and human errors that occur while building and op-
erating these systems [30]. The analysis of problem reports with topic modeling led to the
most popular topics within and across missions, and how popular topics changed over the
lifetime of a mission. Layman et al. found that topic modeling can identify problem themes
within missions and across mission lifetime. However, they identified multiple challenges:
the process of selecting the topic modeling parameters lacks definitive guidance, defining
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semantically-meaningful topic labels requires non-trivial effort and domain expertise, topic
models derived from the combined corpus of missions were biased toward the larger missions,
and topics must be semantically distinct as well as cohesive to be useful.
Wang et al. proposed a novel model and methodology to classify and categorize vulner-
abilities according to their security types [8]. Furthermore, they used Bayesian Networks to
automate the proposed process. The security types were defined as a subset of the NVD
classification scheme, and each vulnerability was classified as one of these types based on its
CVSS Access Vector, Access Complexity, Authentication, Confidentiality Impact, Integrity
Impact, and Availability Impact [31]. In order for this method to be successful, the probabil-
ity distribution of vulnerabilities was calculated from all vulnerabilities in the NVD related
to Firefox. No performance metrics were given, but the authors claimed each software prod-
uct must use its own Bayesian network, which implies that each software project would need
its own network constructed to utilize the proposed methodology. Furthermore, the authors
claimed that the automatically generated results were compared to the CVE type in NVD,
and it “proved the correctness of our method.”
Wright et al. conducted an experiment to estimate the number of misclassified bugs yet
to be identified as vulnerabilities in the MySQL bug report database [7]. To determine which
issues were misclassified, a scoring system was developed in which the first part of the scoring
system was the creation of a list of strings with an associated weight, then the second part
was simply checking each issue for the presence of any of those strings. If an issue contained
any of the strings, then the weight associated with the present string was added to that
issues score. This experiment was performed on a subset of issues from the MySQL bug
database, and after scoring, the results were extrapolated into the entire dataset. It was
claimed that human efforts are largely ineffective in classifying bugs as vulnerabilities, and
with the assumption that any issue including one or more of the strings in the generated list
is a vulnerability, after extrapolation they estimated a 657% to 772% increase in the number
of vulnerabilities for the MySQL project but did not verify these findings.
Gegick et al. used text mining on the descriptions of bug reports to train a statistical
model on manually-labeled bug reports to identify security bug reports that were mislabeled
as non security bug reports [6]. The term ”by document frequency method” was used to
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create feature vectors. More specifically, the SAS text mining tool is used for the feature
vector creations, as well as prediction in the form of singular value decomposition (SVD).
The issue data from four large Cisco projects were used as datasets which the authors stated
that their model identifies a high percentage (77%) of the security bug reports which were
manually mislabeled as non-security bug reports by bug reporters. However, this system
had a very high false positive rate varying from 26.7% to 96.2%.
Often times, bugs are only identified as vulnerabilities long after the bug has been made
public [5]. Wijayasekara et al. denoted such issues as Hidden Impact Bugs (HIBs), and
created a system that can identify such bugs as an extension of their previous work [32].
CVE’s for the Linux kernel were identified, and then corresponding issues were gathered.
The text mining method used was a basic “bag of words” approach where the frequency of
the terms in each issue was placed into a feature vector. A corpus of regular bugs and HIBs
were then created for training and testing. The Naive Bayes, Naive Bayes Multinomial, and
Decision Tree classifiers were tested, resulting in a precision of 0.88, 0.78, 0.28, a recall of
0.02, 0.09, and 0.40 respectively.
Behl et al. published a paper which highly relates to our work [4], however this paper
does not seem to be credible. They claim to have used “the bugzilla repository of bug
reports,” however bugzilla is an issue tracking system software suite and has no repository
of bug reports. This work claimed to use Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency
(TF-IDF) along with an undefined “vector space model,” and compared this performance
to an approach using Naive Bayes. Accuracy and precision were the only performance
metrics used, which do not relate well to the systems ability to classify bugs as security or
non-security. Both performance metrics can give misleading results when using imbalanced
datasets, which is expected in this situation. The reported accuracy and precision (95.7%
and 93.2% respectively) is only marginally better than Naive Bayes.
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Chapter 3
Vulnerability Profiles
A vulnerability profile, as defined in Section 1.1, is an empirical view of software secu-
rity vulnerabilities. Three NASA bug tracking systems were used to create three separate
datasets, in which each security issue was labeled into a specific security class. This infor-
mation was then used to look for trends that could potentially differentiate security from
non-security issues, as well as the most frequent security themes that each dataset contains.
In this chapter, we explore research questions 1 and 1a.
1. What are the dominant types of vulnerabilities in NASA ground and flight software
systems?
a) Are they consistent across projects and project types?
The procedures and results presented in this section are the result of an empirical study
based on the data described in detail in the following section. Following the dataset descrip-
tion, several potential classification schema’s are described, and the schema selected for use
in this work discussed. The approach taken to manually classify (label) each issue is then
described, followed by the results for each dataset. This section is concluded by comparing
the datasets for common trends and findings, the threats to validity of this empirical study,
and finally by answering the aforementioned research questions 1 and 1a.
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3.1 Datasets
Three main datasets from NASA used were utilized for this work: ground mission IV&V
issues, flight mission IV&V issues, and flight mission developer issues. The developer issues
are obtained from the developers of the software whereas the IV&V issues are obtained from
the Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) analysts. The issue reports by the
IV&V analysts were of very good quality containing in depth analysis of the problems. The
data extracted from the developer’s bug tracking system was also good, yet did not contain
quite the same level of detail and security specific information. The datasets discussed below
were created from all “closed” issues from their corresponding bug tracking systems.
The first dataset is the IV&V issues extracted from the bug tracking system of a NASA
ground mission and will be referred to as Ground Mission IV&V Issues. This system consisted
of approximately 1.36 million source lines of code, and the bug tracking system contained
1,779 issues created over four years. The IV&V analysts put special emphasis on considering
the security impact of each issue, and as a result 350 ( 20%) of the issues were marked as
potentially security related. Most issues contained very detailed descriptions, titles, com-
ments, and the issues determined to be security related were labeled as such. In addition,
the issue descriptions contained security related terminology making it a very good dataset
for this project. The fields are detailed in Table B.1.
The second dataset is the IV&V issues extracted from the bug tracking system of a NASA
flight mission and will be referred to as Flight Mission IV&V Issues. This system consisted
of approximately 924 thousand source lines of code, and the bug tracking system contained
506 issues created over four years. After removal of issues marked as “Withdrawn” or “Not
an Issue,” 383 remained. Although this dataset was also from the IV&V analysts, there was
no special consideration put towards the security of each issue. This resulted in the issue
descriptions containing very little security related terminology, and were focused mainly on
proper system operation. The fields of this bug tracking system are detailed in B.1.
The third dataset is the Developer issues extracted from the bug tracking system of the
same NASA flight mission as Flight Mission IV&V Issues and will be referred to as Flight
Mission Developer Issues. This bug tracking system consisted of 1,947 Developer Change
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Requests (DCRs) created over five and a half years. 573 of these DCRs were marked as
“Defects,” whereas the others were marked as “Change Requests” or some other non-issue
related category. Only “Defect” DCRs were included in the dataset, and any mentioning of
an issue from this project refers to only the “Defect” DCRs. This dataset originated from
developers instead of the IV&V analysts, resulting in a much greater focus on proper project
operation instead of security. The fields of this bug tracking system are detailed in B.2.
The aforementioned datasets originate from one of two sources (IV&V analysts or de-
velopers) and from one of two projects (flight mission or ground mission). This creates
natural groupings for comparison. The ground mission IV&V issues dataset will be com-
pared to flight mission IV&V issues dataset to identify trends consistent across ground and
flight missions. The flight mission IV&V dataset will be compared against the flight mission
developer issues to identify problematic themes across IV&V and developer issues.
3.2 Classification Schema
In order to classify a bug report, a classification schema is needed. Common problems
among classification schemas are undefined levels of specificity, very complicated structure,
and non-hierarchical graphs. This section explores some software vulnerability and/or weak-
ness classification schemes along with some strengths and weaknesses of each. At the end of
this section, one of the mentioned classification schemes will be selected for use in the rest
of this work.
Common Weakness and Enumeration (CWE) is a formal list of software weakness types
aimed at serving as a common language for describing software security weaknesses in ar-
chitecture, design, or code. The CWE list also serves as a standard measuring stick for
software security tools targeting those weaknesses, and to provide a common baseline stan-
dard for weakness identification, mitigation, and prevention efforts [33]. Each entry in this
list is given a number such as CWE-120, describes a security weakness, and from here on
out a CWE will refer to an individual entry (i.e. CWE-120) in the CWE formal list. As
quickly getting information from a list of 1004 CWE’s is nearly impossible, a number of
views (as defined in Section 1.1) have been developed to ease grouping similar CWE’s based
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on differing factors, as well as easing the use of this general knowledge. Many views will be
discussed and compared in this section, which attempt to minimize or eliminate common
problems such as undefined levels of specificity, very confusing non-hierarchical structure, or
structuring consisting of child CWE’s having multiple parent CWE’s (as defined in Section
1.1).
Similar to CWE is the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) dictionary [34].
This contains common names for publicly known cybersecurity vulnerabilities and often
includes examples, descriptions, and are mapped to one or more CWE’s. In more general
terms, a CVE is an account of a publicly know vulnerability, which is often grouped into one
or more CWE’s in order to describe the type of underlying problem more accurately and
in more common terms. Because this is a dictionary of known vulnerabilities, it cannot be
used as a classification schema, but could possibly be leverages to get real world examples
of specific CWE’s.
CWE-2000 is the Comprehensive CWE Dictionary View (from here on denoted as CWE-
2000) covers all elements in CWE. It contains 1004 total CWE’s with no particular grouping
or classification [35]. This listing of 1004 CWE’s offers no classifying advantage as there is
no relationships drawn, similarities defined, or any attempt to ease the confusing nature of
classifying such a large corpora of software weaknesses. This view will not be considered as
a potential classification schema for use in this project.
CWE-1000 is the Research Concepts view and was created with the intent to facilitate
research into weaknesses, including their inter-dependencies and their role in vulnerabili-
ties [36]. It classifies weaknesses in a way that largely ignores how they can be detected,
where they appear in code, and when they are introduced in the software development life-
cycle. Instead, it is mainly organized according to the abstractions of software behaviors. It
uses a deep hierarchical organization which provides many levels of abstraction and speci-
ficity. Where possible, this view uses abstractions that do not consider particular languages,
framework, technologies, life-cycle development phases, frequency of occurrence, or types of
resources. It explicitly identifies relationships that form chains and composites, which have
not been a formal part of past classification efforts. This classification scheme contains a
total of 723 CWE’s, grouped into 11 main classes. One issue with this classification scheme
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is the deep hierarchical structure used: The level of specificity is not the same across all
depths. For example, if two CWE’s are compared that were taken from two levels beyond
different main classes of this classification scheme, one may be very specific to a certain
problem and the other may detail a very general set of problems.
CWE-888 is the Software Fault Pattern (SFP) view and is a classification scheme devel-
oped as a result of a Department of Defense (DoD) sponsored project through KDM Analytics
[37] [38]. This view developed a formal specification of software weaknesses/vulnerabilities
that enable automation through focusing on characteristics that are discernible in code,
while also ensuring systematic coverage of the “weakness space.” The classification schema
contains 705 CWE’s, grouped into 21 primary and 62 secondary classes. Furthermore, every
CWE within this view is classified to exactly one primary and one secondary class, creating a
three level hierarchical view. This structure does not have the specificity problem described
about CWE-1000. The three levels have well defined levels of specificity with the primary
class being the most general, and the third level (individual CWE’s) being the most granu-
lar. This along with the very intuitive structuring makes this classification a good potential
match for this work.
CWE-700 is the Seven Pernicious Kingdoms View which originated from Cigital [39] [40].
This schema offers a simple, effective organization structure for software security coding
errors. The creators argue that all other security taxonomies are too complex, due to people
on average being good at keeping track of seven (plus or minus two) things. This provides
the motivation to create a taxonomy with only seven primary classes or topics. However,
due to this simplified classification structure, only 97 CWE’s grouped into seven primary
classes are covered in this two level hierarchical structure. This schema is too simplistic and
too general for use in this work.
CWE-699 is the Development Concepts view which organizes weaknesses around concepts
that are frequently used in software development [41]. Accordingly, this view aligns closely
with the perspectives of developers, educators, and assessment vendors. It borrows heavily
from the organizational structure used by Seven Pernicious Kingdoms, but it also provides a
variety of other categories that are intended to simplify navigation, browsing, and mapping.
This classification scheme contains 756 CWE’s, organized in a hierarchical structure similar
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to CWE-1000. There are six primary classes, which can contain any number of CWE’s,
subclasses, or nested subclasses. In terms of the viability of using this classification schema
for this work, this schema has the same specificity problem as CWE-1000 and will no longer
be considered.
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) integrates the CWE list into the scoring of
CVE vulnerabilities by utilizing their own subset of the overall CWE structure [42]. This
subset is simply 123 CWE’s which the NVD analysts use to assist in scoring CVE’s at both a
fine a coarse granularity. While this subset may provide good vulnerability coverage, the lack
of classes makes classifying an issue into it very difficult, time consuming, and non-trivial.
This schema will no longer be considered for this work.
The schema that best fit the needs of this project was the CWE-888 Software Fault
Pattern View. CWE-888 includes a three level hierarchical structure of which the first two
levels (primary and secondary classes) were used for our classification. This allowed for each
issue to have a general (primary) class, and a more specific (secondary) class. Furthermore,
the organizational structure of this schema was a good fit for this work as it was developed
for enabling automation through focusing on characteristics that are discernible in code.
A more complete picture of this schema can be seen in Table A.1. The description of the
Software Fault Pattern (SFP) Numbers is out of the scope of this thesis, but can be found
from [37].
3.3 Issue Labeling Approach
For each of the datasets, we manually inspected and labeled each security issue with
its corresponding CWE-888 primary and secondary class. Every issue found to be not
security related was assigned a primary and secondary class of “Not Security Related.” The
fields from the bug tracking systems used for this labeling were the “Title,” “Subject,”
“Description,” and if needed the “Recommended Actions” or “Solution.” This method
allowed for the classification of each issue into two specific levels of detail with the primary
class being more general, and the secondary class being more specific.
An interesting problem encountered was that in some cases, even though an issue can
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be assigned to a CWE-888 primary and secondary class, it may not necessarily be security
related. An example of this could be an issue labeled with the primary class of “Risky
Values,” and secondary class of “Glitch in Computation.” Even though this is a problem
and concern, just because a formula is not generating the correct result does not mean that
this issue is a security concern. Additionally, we did not have the necessary information to
determine if the security related issues could be exploited or what the overall security related
impact on the system would be. Here, similarly to labeling done by static code analysis tools,
we took a conservative approach and treated as security related every issue to which a CWE
class could be assigned. Several Examples of this classification follow:
The description of an issue read “. . . Line 277: Null pointer dereference of ‘getServiceS-
tatusInfo(...)’ where null is returned from a method,” then this issue was labeled with the
primary cluster of “Memory Access” and the secondary cluster of “Faulty Pointer Use.”
An issue description read “. . . Table 1-11 lists XYZ as a unidirectional interfaces,
but Figure 1-4 shows this connection as bidirectional,” then this issue was labeled as “Not
security Related.”
As a final example, an issue description read “. . . The stream is opened on line 603
of file1. If an exception were to occur at any point before line 613 where it is closed, then
the ‘try’ would exit and the stream would not be closed,” then the issue was labeled with
the primary class of “Resource Management” and the secondary class of “Failure to Release
Resource.”
Upon completion of the labeling, each dataset was analyzed. The results and conclusions
are detailed in the following sections.
3.4 Ground Mission IV&V Issues
Of the 1779 issues in this dataset, 350 (20%) were marked as potentially security related
by the IV&V analysts. After labeling, it was determined that 133 of the 350 were truly
security related ( 38% of the original 350). This reduction in security related issues is due to
a large concentration of testing issues. A testing issue is an issue detailing a problem with
a testing system instead of a problem with the system being tested. No CWE’s exist that
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cover such a case and testing issues are not dealing with the actual system under concern,
therefore we labeled these issues as “Not Security Related.”
Figure 3.1: Ground Mission IV&V Issues - Issue Category Distribution
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of security and non-security issues across the different
issue categories. The issue category defines what aspect of the project the issues falls under.
As shown, the Design category contained the highest number of issues. However, this cate-
gory consists of only 2.3% (three of 133) of all security issues. The code category houses the
vast majority of security issues, containing 95.5% (127 of 133) of all security issues.
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Figure 3.2: Ground Mission IV&V Issues - Issue Type Distribution
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of security and non-security issues across the different
issues types, which are most detailed than the issue category. Four dominating issue types
are seen to be “Incomplete Design,” “Incomplete Code,” “Incorrect Code,” and “Incomplete
Test Article.” Similar to the issue category, none of the “Incomplete Test Article” issues
are security related and only one “Incomplete Design” issue is security related. The code
related issues types of “Incomplete Code” and “Incorrect Code” contain 84% (112 of 133) of
security related issue. Furthermore, 43% of the issues in “Incomplete Code” and “Incorrect
Code” are security related.
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Figure 3.3: Ground Mission IV&V Issues - Capability Distribution
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the issue capabilities ordered from the capability
that contains the highest total number of issues to the capability that contains the least.
Capability 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold all of the security issues. Capability 3 has the most security
issues containing 40% (53) of the 133 security issues, followed by Capability 2 with 26% (34)
of the 133 security issues. Although only half of the Capabilities house all of the security
related issues, they are also represent 82% of all Capabilities used. Each capability that
contains security issues have a similar ratio of security to non-security issues.
Figure 3.4: Ground Mission IV&V Issues - Subsystem Distribution
Figure 3.4 shows the subsystem distribution ordered from the subsystem that contains
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the highest total number of issues to the subsystem that contains the least. Subsystem 1
and 2 contribute 70% of all issues, which is consistent with the Pareto Principle. The Pareto
Principle states that for many events, roughly 80% of the effects come from 20% of the
causes. In this case, 70% of all issues, and 86% of all security issues come from two of the
seven subsystems which is consistent with the results shown in [3], [43], [1], and [9].
Figure 3.5: Ground Mission IV&V Issues - Analysis Method Distribution
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of issues with respect to the analysis method used to
detect the issues. The largest proportion of issues (30% of all issues) was found from “Design
Analysis,” however this method did not uncover any security issues. The vast majority of
security issues were discovered using “Implementation Analysis (Static Code Analysis).”
This method was used to discover 91% of all security related issues. Interestingly, the
analysis method of “Security Analysis (Verify Security Control Implementation)” turned up
almost no issues. This is possibly due to the difficulty of determining the potential security
problems in the first place. If a developer is aware of a problem then they are easily able
to fix it, however when a problem is not known, it cannot be fixed. The security analysis
method highlights this difference as the problems the analysts know to look for have already
been fixed. Furthermore, the largest portion of security issues were found via Static Code
Analysis.
The analysis method used can greatly effect the results of this analysis. Often times, the
results are specific to a specific tool or method, and when a different tool or method is used
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different results are presented. The amount of time and energy invested in each method
could also influence its effectiveness. The only information pertaining to the amount of
effort expended on each method known is that significant amount of static code analysis was
performed, and therefore a complete picture of the effectiveness of each analysis cannot be
drawn from this information.
Figure 3.6: Ground Mission IV&V Issues - Severity Distribution
NASA severity ratings range from 1 to 5, with 1 being the most severe. The majority of
all issues (72%) are of severity 3 as shown in Figure 3.6. This trend remains the same for
security issues as well, with 86% of all security related issues being of severity 3.
Figure 3.7: Ground Mission IV&V Issues - Phase Introduced Distribution
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Figure 3.8: Ground Mission IV&V Issues - Phase found Distribution
Figure 3.7 and 3.8 detail the phase in which each issue was introduced and found in the
project. The majority of security issues (91%) were introduced in the implementation phase,
which again shows how hard implementing security code is compared to determining the
requirements and design from a security standpoint. Furthermore, the phase in which issues
were found closely followed the phase in which they were introduced.
Figure 3.9: Ground Mission IV&V Issues - Distribution of issues across CWE-888 Primary
Classes
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Figure 3.9 shows the distribution of security issues across the primary CWE-888 classes,
however only 11 out of the 21 primary classes were observed. The class of “Memory Access”
consisted of 53% of all security issues. Furthermore, the primary classes of “Memory Access,”
“Unused entities,” “Exception Management,” “Risky Values,” and “Resource Management”
contain 92% of all security issues.
Figure 3.10: Ground Mission IV&V Issues - Primary and Secondary CWE-888 Class
Distributions
The secondary CWE-888 classes provide more detail than simply the primary classes.
Figure 3.10 shows the overall distribution of security issues in both the primary and secondary
class, which better represents the types of security issues. This figure shows that of the 70
issues in the “Memory Access” primary class, 63 are of the secondary class “Faulty Pointer
Use.” The remaining dominating class of “Unused Entities,” “Exception Management,” and
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“Risky Values” were comprised mainly of the secondary classes “Dead Code,” “Ambiguous
Exception Type,” and “Glitch in Computation” respectively.
3.5 Flight Mission IV&V Issues
After the removal of “Withdrawn” or “Not an Issue” issues, 383 issues remained. After
labeling, 157 issues were marked as security related (41% of all issues). The following figures
show the results of the analysis.
Figure 3.11: Flight Mission IV&V Issues - Issue Category Distribution
As shown in Figure 3.11, most of the security related issuse were associated with the
“Code” category, which contributed 92% of all security related issues. This project did not
have the testing issue problem as described in the previous section, which is a result of no
issue in this dataset containing any specific security related tags but all issues being manually
classified into the CWE-888 classification scheme. This distribution of security related issues
aligns with the conclusions presented in the previous section, with majority of security issues
related to the implementation, rather than early life cycle phases.
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Figure 3.12: Flight Mission IV&V Issues - Issue Type Distribution
Figure 3.12 shows four issue types dominating the majority of the security issues: “In-
correct Code,” “Incomplete Code,” “Missing Code,” and “Extraneous Code.” It is not
surprising that these dominating issues types are all code related having in mind that code
issue category had most of the security issues.
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Figure 3.13: Flight Mission IV&V Issues - Defect Distribution
Figure 3.13 provides a breakdown by defect categories. The three dominating defect
categories are “Algorithms and Processing,” “Control, Logic and Sequence,” and “Data.”
Figure 3.14: Flight Mission IV&V Issues - Capability Distribution
Figure 3.14 is not very informative. Each capability contains approximately the same
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proportion of security issue with respect to its size (i.e. each capability is approximately
30% security and 70% non-security). Even though security issues are more concentrated in
certain development phases or types (i.e. the implementation or coding), the functionality
of the code being created has little to no impact on the number of security issues associated
with it.
Figure 3.15: Flight Mission IV&V Issues - Subsystem Distribution
Figure 3.15 shows that 88% of all security issues and 88% of all issues fall into three
subsystems. Furthermore, according to this figure, Subsystem 3 is the most security issue
prone with 53% of the issues related to this subsystem being security related.
Figure 3.16: Flight Mission IV&V Issues - Severity Distribution
As shown in Figure 3.16, severity levels 3 and 4 contain 79% of all security issues and
86% of all issues.
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Figure 3.17: Flight Mission IV&V Issues - Phase Introduced Distribution
Figure 3.18: Flight Mission IV&V Issues - Phase Found Distribution
Figure 3.19: Flight Mission IV&V Issues - Phase Resolved Distribution
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 show results consistent with the Ground Mission IV&V issues,
where the majority of security issues were introduced (85%) and found (85%) in the imple-
mentation phase. The phase in which an issue was found closely follows the phase in which
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the issue was introduced. Unlike the Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset, the Flight Mis-
sion IV&V Issues dataset included information on the phase in which each issue was resolved,
detailed in Figure 3.19. 75% of security related issues were resolved in the implementation
phase, and the remaining 25% were resolved in the testing phase. Interestingly enough, no
security issues were resolved in the design phase, even though some were introduced and
found in this phase.
Figure 3.20: Flight Mission IV&V Issues - Distribution of issues across CWE-888 Primary
Classes
The diagram shown in Figure 3.20 shows the distribution of security issues when labeled
with their corresponding CWE-888 primary class. Similarly as the Ground Mission IV&V
Issues dataset, only 9 of the 21 primary classes were observed with the dominating classes
of “Other,” “Risky Values,” “Memory Access,” and “Unused Entities.” .
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Figure 3.21: Flight Mission IV&V Issues - Primary and Secondary CWE-888 Class
Distributions
Figure 3.21 shows the distribution of security issues across the primary and secondary
classes. The secondary classes provide more detail on the types of security issues seen
throughout this dataset than the primary classes, giving a more specific picture of the types
of security issues observed. Of the 59 “Other” issues, 55 were of the secondary class “Im-
plementation.” The primary class of “Risky Values” contained 30 issues, all of which with
the secondary class of “Glitch in Computation.” Of the 20 “Memory Access” issues, 14
were of the secondary class “Faulty Buffer Access.” ‘The primary class of “Unused Entities”
contained 23 issues, 18 were of the secondary class “Dead Code.”
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3.6 Flight Mission Developer Issues
After the removal of all issues that were not “Closed” and a “Defect,” 569 issues remained.
Labeling resulted in 374 of these issues marked as security related (66% of all issues), which
is significantly higher than the proportion of security related issue in the other datasets. The
following figures show the results of the analysis.
Figure 3.22: Flight Mission Developer Issues - Issue Type Distribution
Figure 3.22 shows the distribution of issue types. Two dominating categories are “Incor-
rect Implementation” and “Incorrect Operation or Unexpected Behavior.” The dominating
category “Incorrect Implementation” is consistent in what has been seen in the previously
analyzed datasets.
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Figure 3.23: Flight Mission Developer Issues - Subsystem Distribution
Figure 3.23 presents the distribution of security and non-security issues across the sub-
systems used in this dataset. The characteristics are very similar to the previous datasets,
with 88% of all security issues found in only four subsystems, which together houses 89% of
all issues.
Figure 3.24: Flight Mission Developer Issues - Severity Distribution
While the severity ratings used by the IV&V analysts ranged from 1 to 5, the ratings
found in this dataset are Minor, Moderate, and Critical. In a fashion similar to previously
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observed the moderate category dominated, containing 86% of the security issues, and 85%
of all issues. Only 4% of all issues, and 4% of security issues were determined to be critical.
Figure 3.25: Flight Mission Developer Issues - Phase Found Distribution
This dataset contained information about the phase in which each issue was found, yet
no information on when they were introduced or resolved. As shown in Figure 3.25, the
major phases where issues were found were ”Build Verification,” ”Build Integration,” and
”Code Implementation.” This is similar to what has been previously observed in the previous
datasets.
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Figure 3.26: Flight Mission Developer Issues - Distribution of Issues Across CWE-888 Pri-
mary Classes
The diagram shown in Figure 3.26 shows the distribution of security issues when placed
into corresponding CWE-888 class. While only 13 of 21 primary class were observed, “Risky
Values,” “Exception Management,” and “Memory Access” were responsible for 50% of all
security issues.
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Figure 3.27: Flight Mission Developer Issues - Primary and Secondary CWE-888 Class
Distributions
Figure 3.27 show the distribution of security issues across the primary and secondary
classes. The secondary classes provide more detail on the types of security issues seen
throughout this dataset then the primary classes, giving a more specific picture of the types
of security issues observed. The previous datasets saw mostly a single secondary class dom-
inating within each primary class, which is not always the case with this dataset. The
primary class with the most issues is “Risky Values” and all issues of this primary class
are of the secondary class of “Glitch in Computation.” However, the next largest primary
class is “Exception Management” with 90 issues: of these 90 issues, 48 were of the sec-
ondary class “Incorrect Exception Behavior,” and the remaining 42 were of the secondary
class “Unchecked Status Condition.” A similar distribution occurs within the primary class
of “Memory Access” where of the 34 issues, 22 are of the secondary class “Faulty Buffer
Access,” and the remaining 12 are of the secondary class “Faulty Pointer Use.”
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3.7 Comparison of the Results Across Three Datasets
This section presents a comparison of the results across all datasets. The CWE-888
primary and secondary classes are used to compare the security distribution across projects,
as well as the issues most often plaguing NASA systems. Furthermore, the main findings
across these datasets are presented.
Table 3.1: Comparison of Primary Class Distributions Across All Projects
Primary CWE-888 Class
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
Flight Mission
Developer Issues
API (887) 1.9%
Channel (902) 2.7% 6.0%
Exception Management (889) 10.8% 8.2% 27.2%
Memory Access (890) 54.6% 18.3% 12.8%
Memory Management (891) 0.4%
Other (907) 1.5% 24.5% 7.1%
Predictability (905) 0.8%
Privilege (901) 1.2%
Resource Management (892) 6.9% 3.0%
Risky Values (885) 8.5% 21.8% 28.3%
Synchronization (894) 0.8% 3.4%
Tainted Input (896) 1.5% 8.2% 3.8%
UI (906) 0.9% 1.1%
Unused Entities (886) 14.6% 14.5% 3.8%
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Figure 3.28: CWE-888 Primary Class Distribution Graphical Comparison for all Projects
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.28 detail the percent in which each CWE-888 primary classes
contributes to each dataset. The primary classes of “Exception Management,” “Memory
Access,” “Other,” “Risky Values,” and “Unused Entities” account for the most significant
portion of security issues across all projects. Interestingly, primary classes which do not occur
in all datasets, tend to make up for only a small proportion (7% or less) of the datasets they
do appear in.
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Dominating Secondary CWE-888 Class Distributions Across All
Projects
Primary CWE-888 Class
Secondary CWE-888 Class
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
Flight Mission
Developers Issues
Exception Management (889)
Ambiguous Exception Type (960) 7.7%
Incorrect Exception Behavior (961) 4.5% 14.0%
Unchecked Status Condition (962) 3.1% 3.6% 13.2%
Memory Access (890)
Faulty Buffer Access (970) 4.6% 12.7% 8.3%
Faulty Pointer Use (971) 50.0% 5.5% 4.5%
Other (907)
Architecture (975) 0.9%
Design (977) 2.6%
Implementation (978) 1.5% 23.6% 4.5%
Risky Values (885)
Glitch in Computation (998) 8.5% 21.8% 28.3%
Unused Entities (886)
Dead Code (561) 14.6% 10.0% 3.4%
Unused Variable (563) 4.5% 0.4%
Table 3.2 shows the dominating CWE-888 primary classes along with their corresponding
secondary class across all projects. The secondary classes most often occurring in “Exception
Management” issues were “Ambiguous Exception Type,” “Incorrect Exception Behavior,”
and “Unchecked Status Condition.” These secondary class names are specific, self explana-
tory, and will not be discussed further.
“Memory Access” was another dominating class, consisting of “Faulty Buffer Access”
and “Faulty Pointer Use.” These categories include common programming errors such as
null pointer dereferences and buffer overflows. As shown by Younan [18], buffer overflows
continue to be one of the most common vulnerabilities in software systems.
The next dominating primary class is “Other” with the most commonly seen secondary
classes of “Design” and “Implementation.” “Design” consists of weaknesses dealing with
insufficient control flow management or reliance on data/memory layout. “Implementation”
is based around weaknesses such as coding standards violation or containment errors. These
secondary classes were assigned to issues which had security related problems related strictly
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to their design or implementation and could not be placed into any other class.
Another dominating primary class is “Risky Values.” This primary class consists of
the secondary class “Glitch in Computation” which deals with calculation errors. These
involve everything from a divide by zero error to a function call with an incorrect order of
arguments. The Flight Mission Developer Issues dataset had the highest percentage of these
errors. This is potentially be because this was the only bug tracking system from developers.
The developers are more likely to focus on things such as the incorrect generation of results,
and therefore fix them before they reach the IV&V analysts (in this case Flight Mission
IV&V Issues).
The last consistently dominating class is “Unused Entities,” consisting of the “Dead
Code” and “Unused Variable” secondary classes. These issues were abundant across all
project types, but were found much more often in the IV&V datasets.
Table 3.3: Main Findings Across all Datasets
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
Flight Mission
Developers Issues
% Security Issues 9% 41% 66%
Security Issues
Category
95% Code 92% Code Data not available
Severity of Security
Issues
Level 3 dominated (86%)
Levels 3 and 4 dominated (to-
gether 78%). 7% were level 2
Moderate dominated (84%)
Phase Introduced
95% in the Implementation
Phase
85% in the Implementation
Phase
Data not available
Phase Found
Followed closely the phase in-
troduced distribution
Followed closely the phase in-
troduced distribution
Most found during Code Im-
plementation, Build Integra-
tion, and Build Verification
Subsystem
86% found in two subsystems
(70% of all issues)
88% in three subsystems (88%
of all issues)
88% in four subsystems (90%
of all issues)
Five (out of 21)
most frequent Pri-
mary Classes
Exception Management 10.8%
Memory Access 54.6%
Other 1.5%
Risky Values 8.5%
Unused Entities 14.6%
Total 90.0%
Exception Management 8.2%
Memory Access 18.2%
Other 24.5%
Risky Values 21.8%
Unused Entities 14.5%
Total 87.3%
Exception Management 27.2%
Memory Access 12.8%
Other 7.1%
Risky Values 28.3%
Unused Entities 3.8%
Total 79.2%
Table 3.3 shows the main findings for each dataset. The percentage of security issues for
each dataset was covered a wide range (from 9% to 66%). One possibility for this is that the
Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset is a sample from a not yet complete project, as the
Jacob P. Tyo Chapter 3. Vulnerability profile 46
testing phase has not yet begun. However, in Flight Mission IV&V Issues the majority of
all security issues were introduced and found in the implementation phase, which indicates
that the Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset simply had less security related issues.
Not surprisingly, the Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset as well as the Flight Mission
IV&V Issues dataset had the vast majority of security issues belonging to the “Code” cate-
gory (95% and 92% respectively. The Flight Mission Developers Issues dataset however did
not contain this information. This is to be expected as implementing secure code (instead
of developing the requirements or design) proves to be the most difficult aspect of software
security.
Ideally, security issues should be of higher severity than non-security. However, across
all datasets, the majority of all issues along with the majority of security issues were of a
severity level relating to moderate. This is most likely due to the severity being assigned to
an issue before the security implication of that issue are known or realized.
Furthermore, security issues should be fixed in a timely manor to not only minimize the
time that vulnerabilities exist in the system, but to also prevent its propagation. While the
data pertaining to the project phase in which issues were found was not given in the Flight
Mission Developers Issues dataset, in both the Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset and the
Flight Mission IV&V Issues dataset the phase in which an issue was found closely follows the
phase in which it was introduced. This correlates to security issues being found during the
same phase in which they are introduced, and therefore being identified in a timely fashion.
The subsystem is a grouping of software components, juxtaposed to create a modular
piece of code to accomplish a specific task. As these subsystems can be reused, it is important
to determine the risk of introducing security related issues into the system by incorporating
them. This is hard to determine using only the bug tracking system as the amount each
subsystem is used is unknown. However, each dataset shows two to four subsystems which
contain the majority of security issues, and the majority of all issues. Assuming each sub-
system is used in proportion to the total number of issues found for it, then each subsystem
introduce very similar risk into the system through their implementation.
The final row in Table 3.3 details the previously discussed dominating primary CWE-888
class, along with the percent make up of each dataset. For a more detailed description and
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analysis of the distribution of these issues across each dataset, see Table 3.2 and the following
discussion.
3.8 Threats to Validity
Many issues arose during the analysis of each project. One problem with each data set
is that it originates from human analysis. This creates problems because the number of
security related issues depends on the quality of the software artifacts, the validation and
verification (V&V) methods used, and the amount of effort expended in the issue creation,
classification, and analysis. Therefore, vulnerability profiles built from projects bug tracking
systems depend on the quality and completeness of information provided in the bug tracking
system.
Furthermore, some instances arose when a bug report could be correctly classified into
multiple CWE-888 classes. This has no clear solution and was solved by selecting the most
relevant of the possible classes. Although this can change the vulnerability type distribution,
it most likely has little to no effect as the issue is still accounted for, and the number of issues
fitting into multiple classes was small.
As described in Section 3.4, testing issues marked as security related by IV&V analysts
were not included in out analysis. A testing issue details a problem with a testing system,
instead of a problem with the system being testing. No CWE’s exist that cover such a case
and therefore could not be included in the analysis.
Each dataset contained a small amount (15% or less) if issues that did not contain
sufficient information for classification. To classify these issues an analyst or developer
would need to look further into the issue and provide more details. Issues which did not
contain the information necessary for classification to CWE classes were not included in the
analysis.
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3.9 Conclusion
We conducted the empirical analysis of the NASA datasets to determine the vulnerability
distributions and trends. We summarize the research questions 1 and 1a here as follows:
1. What are the dominant types of vulnerabilities in NASA ground and flight software
systems?
a) Are they consistent across projects and project types?
The dominant types of vulnerabilities in NASA ground and flight software systems are
Exception Management, Memory Access, Other, Risky Values, and Unused Entities account-
ing for 79% to 90% of all security issues, depending on the dataset. Looking further into the
secondary classes of these dominating types provided more detail of the exact vulnerability
types as follows: the most commonly observed vulnerabilities among Exception Manage-
ment issues were Ambiguous Exception Type and Incorrect Exception Behavior. The most
commonly observed vulnerabilities among Memory Access issues were Faulty Buffer Access
and Faulty Pointer Use. The most commonly observed vulnerability among Other issues was
Implementation. The most commonly observed vulnerability among Risky Values issues was
Glitch in Computation. The most commonly observed vulnerability among Unused Entities
issues was Dead Code.
While the dominating vulnerability types differ in which contains the highest percentage
of security issues in each dataset, the same five vulnerability types consistently dominate
across ground and flight missions as well as across the IV&V and Developer Datasets.
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Chapter 4
Automated Bug Report Classification
The vulnerability profile described in Chapter 3 provides valuable information to the
analysts and developers that aim to increase the security of the software system under
concern. However, developing such vulnerability profiles required manual classification of
each issue, which is time consuming and costly. This section addresses this concern by using
machine learning techniques to automatically classify bug report. Research questions 2, 2a,
2b, 3, 3a, 4, and 5 will be addressed.
2. Can supervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify software issues as
security related or not?
a) Do some learners perform consistently better than others?
b) How much data must be set aside for training in order to produce accurate clas-
sification results?
3. Can supervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify security issues to spe-
cific security classes?
a) Are some classes harder to predict than others?
4. Can unsupervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify software issues as
security related or not?
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5. How does the performance of supervised and unsupervised machine learning algorithms
compare when classifying software bug reports?
4.1 Datasets, Data Extraction, and Preprocessing
The datasets used throughout this chapter are the same datasets as described in Section
3.1. Although these datasets contained many fields as described in Tables B.1 and B.2, only
the Title, Subject, and Description of each issue were used for the automated classification.
These fields were selected because every issue includes them, and they do not depend on data
that is only available after extensive human analysis such as the “Recommended Solution.”
Furthermore, the CWE-888 class of each issue was kept as the class label.
Specifically, the Title, Subject, and Description of each issue were extracted, and then
concatenated into a single string. The preprocessing steps of removing all non-alphanumeric
characters using a regular expression in python, converting all characters to lowercase with
python, remove stop words using python’s Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) English stop
word list [44], and then stem each word with python’s Lovins stemming algorithm imple-
mentation [45]. Stop words are words that do not contain important significance to be used
in this classification.
After all of the preprocessing steps were completed, we were left with one string for each
issue in the dataset. The features to be used for the machine learning were then extracted
from these strings as described in the next section.
4.2 Feature Vectors
Three tyes of feature vectors were used throughout this project: Binary Bag-of-Words
Frequency (BF), Term Frequency (TF), and Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency
(TF-IDF). Traditional terminology when discussing these methods include terms, documents,
and corpus. This work has three corpora, one for each dataset and will be denoted in the
same manor as the datasets they originated from: Ground Mission IV&V Issues, Flight
Mission IV&V Issues, and Flight Mission Developers Issues. A “term” is a word within a
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document, or in this case a word in the string representation of an issue. A document is a
collection of terms, or in this case a string representing an issue. A corpora is a collection of
documents, or in this case the collection of strings representing an issue from a specific bug
tracking system. From here on, term, document, and corpus will refer to the aforementioned
definitions.
All of the aforementioned feature extraction methods produce a vector of numeric values
for each document. Each method also does this in a similar way, by each location in the
vector representing a term, and the numeric value at the location representing the occur-
rence of that term in the document. The words which each location in these feature vectors
represent is referred to as the vocabulary. This is an important aspect of these feature ex-
traction methods. Selecting a large vocabulary would improve the coverage, and therefore
the amount of terms extracted from each document analyzed; however, this leads to a very
large dimensionality, increasing time complexity, and could result in unnecessary noise. Fur-
thermore, too small of a vocabulary could result in insufficient information to classify each
document with. The typical approach for selecting the feature extraction vocabulary is to
use every term in the corpus. This approach however is problematic as it creates such a large
dimensionality (1,970,810 terms in the largest cast), and when scaling this work the time
complexity becomes a barrier. To avoid this issue, the CWE-888 data was preprocessed in
the same was as mentioned in the previous Section, and the remaining terms were used as
the vocabulary (reducing the dimensionality to 2938 terms).
The most simplistic feature extraction method is the Binary Bag-of-Words Frequency
(BF) as shown in Equation 4.1. This method only determines if each term in the vocabulary
is in the document or not. Equation 4.1 shows that the BF of any term can only be 1 or 0.
BF(term) is the binary frequency of term, and f(term) represents the frequency (or number
of occurrences) of term in document.
BF (term) =
{
0 f(term) = 0
1 f(term) > 0
(4.1)
The Term Frequency (TF) feature extraction method (as shown in Equation 4.2) retains
more information about the document than the BF. Instead of reducing a document into 1’s
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and 0’s corresponding to the presence or absence of a term, TF records the frequency (or
number of occurrences) of term in the document. TF(term) is the term frequency of term,
and f(term) represents the frequency (or number of occurrences) of term in the document.
TF (term) = f(term) (4.2)
The Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) feature extraction method
(as shown in Equation 4.3) is an extension of the TF feature extraction method, that weights
the importance of a term in a specific document inversely to how often it appears in other
documents. This is done to decrease the effect a term which appears in many documents
has on the feature vector, as a term which appears in a wide range of documents would
contain little discriminatory information. tfidf(term) represents the tfidf score of term in
the document, f(term) is the frequency (or number of occurrences) of term in the document,
n is the total number of documents, and N(term) is the number of documents that term
appears in.
tfidf(term) = f(term) ∗ log n
N(term)
(4.3)
A common variation to these feature extraction methods is to exclude any terms that do
not appear a minimum number of times in a document. This minimum frequency is often
used to reduce the noise of the dataset, however this work focused on bug reports which
often include only one word pertaining to the security aspect of the issue. Therefore, no
minimum frequency was set to avoid loosing important information.
4.3 Classifiers
Machine learning classifiers fall into two main categories: supervised and unsupervised
[46]. A supervised learning technique is any approach in which the true class of the training
data is used to infer a function or model to describe the output from the input data. The
supervised learning methods used in this work and discussed below are: Bayesian Network
(BN), k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN), Naive Bayes (NB), Naive Bayes Multinomial (NBM),
Random Forest (RF), and Support Vector Machine (SVM).
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P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
(4.4)
Equation 4.4 presents Bayes’ theorem where P(A) and P(B) are the probabilities of
observing A and B without regard to each other, P (A|B) is the probability of observing
event A given that B is true (referred to as a conditional probability), and P (B|A) is the
probability of observing event B given that A is true [47]. This theorem is the basis for the
Naive Bayes, Naive Bayes Multinomial, and Bayesian Network classifiers described below.
P (X|C) = Πni=1P (Xi|C) (4.5)
The Naive Bayes classifier is a result of the unrealistic assumption that strong inde-
pendence exists between the features, and presented in Equation 4.5, where X is a feature
vector and C is a class. Although this assumption is unrealistic, the Naive Bayes classifier
is remarkably successful in practice [48]. The implementation of this algorithm in Weka was
used [49].
P (x|Ck) = (
∑
i xi)!
Πixi!
Πip
xi
ki (4.6)
As an expansion of the Naive Bayes classifier, a multinomial event model is expected
correlating to the feature vectors being probabilities of a multinomial distribution [50]. The
multinomial expansion on the Naive Bayes Theorem is show in in Equation 4.6 where x is the
feature vector, pi is the probability that even i occurs, and k is the class. In simpler terms,
this assumes the input is of a multinomial distribution. This algorithm was implemented
using Weka [49].
A Bayesian Network (or Bayes Net) is a probabilistic directed acyclic graphical model
that represents a set of random variables and their conditional dependencies [51]. In simpler
terms, a Bayesian network can be considered a mechanism for automatically applying Bayes’
theorem (as shown in Equation 4.4) to complex problems. A common example is that
a Bayesian Network could represent the probabilistic relationships between diseases and
symptoms. Given symptoms, the network can be used to compute the probabilities of the
presence of various diseases. Bayes Net was implemented using Weka [49].
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Random Forests operate by constructing a multitude of decision trees at training time
and outputting the class that is the mode of the classes of the individual trees [52]. Decision
trees are know to overfit, and therefore the Random forest approach helps to correct for this
overfitting. Decision trees map observations (branches) about an item to conclusions about
the item’s target value (leaves). This classifier was implemented using Weka [49].
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a non-probabilistic binary linear classifier, which max-
imizes the distance between the decision line (the line separating the two classes) and each
of the two classes [53]. Although this is a linear model, it can efficiently perform non-linear
classification using a kernel trick which maps the input into a higher dimensionality feature
space. This classifier was implemented using Weka [49].
Unsupervised learning is any technique in which algorithms or models are used to infer
a function to describe hidden structure from unlabeled data. The unsupervised classifiers
used in this work and discussed below are Cosine Similarity and kNN.
k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) is a classification method in which an input is classified by a
majority vote of its closest neighbors, with the input being assigned to the class most common
among its k nearest neighbors (where k is a positive integer) [54]. This among the simplest of
machine learning algorithms, and is a form of lazy-learning where all computation is deferred
until classification. The distance metric used for this classifier was the Euclidean distance as
described in Equation 4.7, where D(a, b) represents the Euclidean distance between vectors
a and b and n represents the dimensionality of the vectors. This classifier was implemented
using Weka [49].
D(a, b) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(bi − ai) (4.7)
Equation 4.8 shows the formula used to calculate the cosine similarity between two vectors
A and B [55]. While this is simply a distance metric, it can be used to represent the similarity
between two documents that are represented in feature vectors. Therefore, the documents
can be classified as the class of which they are most “similar.” This method was implemented
using python [45].
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similarity(A,B) =
A ∗B
||A||||B|| (4.8)
4.4 Performance Evaluation
The metrics used for performance evaluation are derived from the confusion matrix shown
in Table 4.1 [56]. The true or positive class for this work was chosen to be security related
issues, and the false or negative class was chosen to be the non-security issues. The following
performance metrics were used: accuracy, precision, recall, probability of false alarm (PFA),
F-Score, and G-Score. The equations and description of each metric are given below.
Table 4.1: Performance Measure Confusion Matrix
Predicted Class Class
Security Issue Non-Security Issue
True Class
Security Issue Count of True Positives (TP) Count of False Negatives (FN)
Non-Security Issue Count of False Positives (FP) Count of True Negatives (TN)
The accuracy as shown in Equation 4.9 describes the total number of correctly classified
issues with respect to all issues. This metric is of limited value to this work due to the
effect imbalanced data has on it. For example, if only 10% of the issues in a project were
security related, then an accuracy of 90% could be obtained simply by labeling all issues as
non-security.
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(4.9)
The precision as shown in Equation 4.10 describes the total number of correctly classified
security issues out of all issues determined to be security related. Again, this measure can
be skewed with imbalanced data.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(4.10)
The recall as shown in Equation 4.11 is one of the most important performance metrics
for this work, and often referred to as the probability of detection. The recall describes the
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probability of detecting a security issue. This metric is one of the most important for this
work as missing a security issue can lead to vulnerabilities that significantly decrease the
software system’s integrity.
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(4.11)
The probability of false alarm (PFA) describes the probability of labeling a non-security
issue as security. This measure tends to be very high in automated security tasks in an
attempt to catch all security issues.
PFA =
FP
TN + FP
(4.12)
The F-Score is the harmonic mean between precision and recall, which describes how
well an automated system is able to balance the performance between precision and recall.
A system with a higher F-Score usually relates to better performance.
F-Score = 2 ∗ precision ∗ recall
precision + recall
(4.13)
The G-Score is the harmonic mean between recall and one minus the probability of false
alarm. This metric will be highly scrutinized as well as it accounts for the two most important
measures in security detection systems.
G-Score = 2 ∗ recall ∗ (1− PFA)
recall + (1− PFA) (4.14)
When reporting the results from multiclass classification, both the macro-averaged and
the weighted average of the performance metrics listed above were used. Macro-averaging
treats each class as equally important, whereas the weighted average weights each class with
respect to the number of instances it contains. The weighted average is then biased towards
the largest or larger class(es), whereas the macro-averaged performance metrics may not
show performance which accurately describes the number of correctly classified instances.
The weight average and macro-average equations are shown below where i represents the
number of classes, Mi represents the performance metric being averaged for each class, and
wi represents the number of bug reports in each class.
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Macro-average =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Mi (4.15)
Weighted Average =
∑n
i=0 Miwi∑n
i=0 wi
(4.16)
4.5 Supervised Learning
As defined in Section 4.3, supervised learning is an approach in which the true class
of the training data is used to infer a function or model (train a learner) to describe the
output from the input data. This section describes the procedure used to train and test
each automated system that could be created from combining one of the feature extraction
methods mentioned in Section 4.2, as well as one of the supervised classifiers listed in Section
4.3. Each system will be denoted as (Feature Extraction Method) (Classifier). For example,
if the Term Frequency feature extraction method was used with the Naive Bayes Multinomial
(NBM) classifier, this would be denoted as TF NBM.
Even though each system is made up of a different feature extraction and supervised
classifier combination, the process used to train and test each system is the same. Therefore,
the remainder of this section will use the term system to refer to all feature extraction and
classifier combinations.
Each system will be tested on the corpora from each of the datasets described in Section
4.2. Each corpus must be separated into a training and a testing set in which no document
appears in both sets. 10-fold stratified cross validation, as well as 75%, 50%, and 25%
percentage splits where used to create four sets of training and testing data per corpus, in
order to test each system’s performance with respect to amount of training data needed.
After these training and testing sets were obtained, each system was presented each doc-
ument and label in the training set. The system then used the labels to tune the underlying
function or model to the training data, by predicting the label of the input document, and
comparing this result to the true label of the input document. The system then updates
the underlying function or model accordingly. After the system has been presented with all
training documents, the testing documents are presented to the system. The system gen-
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erates labels for the testing data based on what it learned from the training data, and the
performance is then evaluated by comparing the predicted labels to the true labels of the
testing issues.
4.6 Supervised Two Class Classification
Using the procedure mentioned above, testing each system on each corpus as a two-class
problem meant simply labeling all documents labeled with a CWE-888 class to “Security
Related,” and label the rest as “Not Security Related.” Each systems ability to distinguish
between a security and a non-security bug report was tested by addressing research questions
2, 2a, and 2b addressed. These results are detailed in the next section.
2. Can supervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify software issues as
security related or not?
a) Do some learners perform consistently better than others?
b) How much data must be set aside for training in order to produce accurate clas-
sification results?
4.6.1 Two Class Classification Results
Table 4.2 presents the classification performance for each dataset when using Binary
Bag-of-Words feature extraction and each supervised classifier, and 10-fold stratified cross
validation. The column corresponding to the classifier that performs the best (with respect to
G-Score) for each dataset is in bold. Interestingly, the best performing classifier is different for
each dataset. Furthermore, a classifier which performs very well on one dataset, may perform
very poorly on another. An example of this is the Bayesian Network: while performing the
best on the Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset, it performed the worst (G-Score of 0) on
the Flight Mission Developers Issues dataset. When using the BF feature extraction method,
a Bayesian Network classifier is most effective for the Ground Mission IV&V issue dataset,
a Random Forest is most effective for the Flight Mission IV&V dataset, and Naive Bayes is
most effective for the Flight Mission Developers Issues dataset.
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Table 4.2: Two-Class Classification Performance of BF Feature Vector and all Classifiers
Across All Projects
Ground
Mission
IV&V
Issues
Supervised
System
BF BN BF kNN BF NB BF NBM BF RF BF SVM
Accuracy 87.4% 94.6% 87.2% 88.7% 94.8% 94.3%
Precision 37.0% 65.4% 36.7% 39.4% 80.3% 70.7%
Recall 93.4% 62.5% 93.4% 89.7% 41.9% 42.6%
PFA 13.1% 2.7% 13.3% 11.4% 0.9% 1.5%
F-Score 0.530 0.639 0.527 0.547 0.551 0.532
G-Score 0.900 0.761 0.899 0.891 0.589 0.595
Flight
Mission
IV&V
Issues
Supervised
System
BF BN BF kNN BF NB BF NBM BF RF BF SVM
Accuracy 69.9% 76.2% 70.7% 80.1% 84.0% 81.4%
Precision 58.3% 70.4% 59.1% 70.6% 80.8% 79.1%
Recall 94.3% 72.6% 93.0% 88.5% 80.3% 74.5%
PFA 47.1% 21.3% 44.9% 25.8% 13.3% 13.8%
F-Score 0.674 0.715 0.723 0.785 0.805 0.767
G-Score 0.678 0.755 0.692 0.807 0.834 0.799
Flight
Mission
Developers
Issues
Supervised
System
BF BN BF kNN BF NB BF NBM BF RF BF SVM
Accuracy 65.8% 66.9% 66.9% 70.1% 69.5% 67.1%
Precision 65.8% 69.4% 77.7% 70.2% 69.9% 74.7%
Recall 100.0% 89.0% 69.8% 94.6% 94.4% 75.7%
PFA 100.0% 75.5% 38.6% 77.2% 78.3% 49.5%
F-Score 0.794 0.780 0.735 0.806 0.803 0.752
G-Score 0.000 0.384 0.653 0.367 0.353 0.606
Table 4.3 presents the classification performance for each dataset when using the Term
Frequency (TF) feature extraction method and each supervised classifier. The column cor-
responding to the classifier that performs the best (with respect to G-Score) for each dataset
is in bold. Unlike Table 4.2, the best performing classifier (SVM) was consistent across the
Flight Mission IV&V Issues and the Flight Mission Developers Issues datasets. Consistently
with Table 4.2 however, a classifier that performs well on one dataset does not imply that
it performs well with another. When using the TF feature extraction method, the Naive
Bayes Multinomial classifier is most effective for the Ground Mission IV&V Issues, and the
Support Vector Machine classifier is the most effective for both Flight Mission datasets.
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Table 4.3: Two-Class Classification Performance of TF Feature Vector and all Classifiers
Across All Projects
Ground
Mission
IV&V
Issues
Supervised
System
TF BN TF kNN TF NB TF NBM TF RF TF SVM
Accuracy 87.4% 93.5% 85.2% 87.9% 94.9% 94.1%
Precision 37.1% 57.3% 32.0% 38.0% 82.6% 66.0%
Recall 93.4% 60.3% 83.1% 93.4% 41.9% 47.1%
PFA 13.1% 3.7% 14.6% 12.6% 0.7% 2.0%
F-Score 0.531 0.588 0.462 0.540 0.556 0.549
G-Score 0.900 0.742 0.842 0.903 0.589 0.636
Flight
Mission
IV&V
Issues
Supervised
System
TF BN TF kNN TF NB TF NBM TF RF TF SVM
Accuracy 69.6% 70.9% 75.1% 78.3% 80.4% 83.8%
Precision 57.9% 60.3% 67.8% 67.8% 75.9% 78.8%
Recall 95.5% 86.0% 75.2% 89.8% 76.4% 82.8%
PFA 48.4% 39.6% 24.9% 29.8% 16.9% 15.6%
F-Score 0.721 0.709 0.713 0.773 0.762 0.807
G-Score 0.670 0.710 0.751 0.788 0.796 0.836
Flight
Mission
Developers
Issues
Supervised
System
TF BN TF kNN TF NB TF NBM TF RF TF SVM
Accuracy 65.8% 61.0% 66.9% 70.6% 70.4% 72.3%
Precision 65.8% 71.7% 75.0% 73.6% 71.0% 76.8%
Recall 100.0% 67.2% 74.6% 86.4% 93.2% 83.1%
PFA 100.0% 51.1% 47.8% 59.8% 73.4% 48.4%
F-Score 0.794 0.694 0.748 0.795 0.806 0.798
G-Score 0.000 0.566 0.614 0.549 0.414 0.637
Table 4.4 presents the classification performance for each dataset when using the Term
Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) feature extraction method and each su-
pervised classifier. The column corresponding to the classifier that performs the best (with
respect to G-Score) for each dataset is in bold. Similar to what was seen in Table 4.2, the
best performing classifier for each dataset was different. As in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, a clas-
sifier that performs well on one dataset does not imply that it performs well with another.
When using the TF-IDF feature extraction method, a Bayesian Network performs best on
the Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset, the Naive Bayes Multinomial Classifier performs
best on the Flight Mission IV&V Issues dataset, and the Naive Bayes Classifier works best
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on the Flight Mission Developers Issues dataset.
Table 4.4: Two-Class Classification Performance of TF-IDF Feature Vector and all Classifiers
Across All Projects
Ground
Mission
IV&V
Issues
Supervised
System
TFIDF BN TFIDF kNN TFIDF NB TFIDF NBM TFIDF RF TFIDF SVM
Accuracy 87.6% 93.9% 86.0% 92.8% 94.0% 90.2%
Precision 37.3% 61.7% 34.0% 90.0% 75.0% 40.7%
Recall 91.9% 54.4% 89.0% 6.6% 33.1% 61.0%
PFA 12.8% 2.8% 14.3% 0.1% 0.9% 7.4%
F-Score 0.531 0.578 0.492 0.123 0.459 0.488
G-Score 0.895 0.698 0.873 0.124 0.496 0.735
Flight
Mission
IV&V
Issues
Supervised
System
TFIDF BN TFIDF kNN TFIDF NB TFIDF NBM TFIDF RF TFIDF SVM
Accuracy 70.2% 73.3% 79.3% 82.2% 82.5% 73.6%
Precision 58.4% 61.2% 71.2% 90.1% 80.0% 67.9%
Recall 94.9% 95.5% 83.4% 63.7% 76.4% 67.5%
PFA 47.1% 42.2% 23.6% 4.9% 13.3% 22.2%
F-Score 0.723 0.746 0.768 0.746 0.782 0.677
G-Score 0.679 0.720 0.797 0.763 0.812 0.723
Flight
Mission
Developers
Issues
Supervised
System
TFIDF BN TFIDF kNN TFIDF NB TFIDF NBM TFIDF RF TFIDF SVM
Accuracy 68.0% 64.9% 62.3% 66.0% 70.6% 59.9%
Precision 48.9% 66.7% 73.4% 65.9% 71.2% 73.0%
Recall 94.4% 93.2% 66.9% 100.0% 92.9% 61.9%
PFA 82.6% 89.7% 46.7% 99.5% 72.3% 44.0%
F-Score 0.795 0.777 0.700 0.795 0.806 0.670
G-Score 0.294 0.185 0.593 0.010 0.427 0.588
The previous tables have shown promising results for each dataset. Table 4.5 addressed
research question 2b which asked: How much data must be set aside for training in order
to maintain accurate results? The Binary bag-of-words feature vector was used along with
the Naive Bayes feature vector to address this question: there was no significant difference
between any of the feature extraction methods, and the Naive Bayes classifier was the most
consistently acceptable performing classier across all datasets. As show below, the Ground
Mission IV&V Issues dataset, along with the Flight Mission IV&V Issues dataset both
achieved the best performance when using only 25% of the data for training. Furthermore,
The Flight Mission Developers Issues dataset performed the best when using only 50% of
the data for training. A system which is able to perform well when using a small amount of
data for training is significantly more practical, than one which needs 90% of the data for
training (as in any example using 10-fold cross validation).
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Table 4.5: Performance of BF NB on All Projects vs Amount of Training Data
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
% of Issues
for Training
10% Stratified
Cross Validation
75% 50% 25%
Accuracy 87.2% 86.3% 85.6% 86.7%
Precision 36.7% 38.9% 34.0% 36.9%
Recall 93.4% 92.5% 94.1% 93.5%
PFA 13.3% 14.3% 15.1% 13.9%
F-Score 0.527 0.548 0.500 0.529
G-Score 0.899 0.890 0.893 0.896
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
% of Issues
for Training
10% Stratified
Cross Validation
75% 50% 25%
Accuracy 70.7% 71.6% 76.4% 77.3%
Precision 59.1% 83.7% 87.5% 90.5%
Recall 93.0% 54.2% 66.7% 68.3%
PFA 44.9% 10.6% 11.6% 10.1%
F-Score 0.723 0.658 0.757 0.778
G-Score 0.692 0.675 0.760 0.776
Flight Mission
Developers Issues
% of Issues
for Training
10% Stratified
Cross Validation
75% 50% 25%
Accuracy 66.9% 62.7% 65.1% 66.0%
Precision 77.7% 80.3% 78.5% 75.9%
Recall 69.8% 58.9% 64.2% 71.1%
PFA 38.6% 29.5% 33.3% 43.8%
F-Score 0.735 0.680 0.706 0.734
G-Score 0.653 0.642 0.654 0.628
4.6.2 Two Class Classification Observations
The two class classification of bug reports has been shown possible with good perfor-
mance. Furthermore, it was shown that as small as 25% of the data can be used for testing
without degrading the classification performance. The feature vector used did not effect the
results significantly, and the Naieve Bayes classifier was consistently the best performing, or
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among the best performing classifiers for all datasets. SVM was another consistently high
performing classifier, yet was not as good as Naive Bayes.
The part about the smaller training set can be expanded
4.7 Supervised Multiclass Classification
Each of the corpus as defined in Section 4.2 are labeled for a multiclass classification
problem. Each document is labeled with either “Not Security Related” or its corresponding
CWE-888 class. With the data in this form, it can be processed as previously described
where each document will be classified by the system into one of the CWE-888 classes, or as
“Not Security Related.” This section addressed research questions 3 and 3a, and the results
are detailed in the following section.
3. Can supervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify security issues to spe-
cific security classes?
a) Are some classes harder to predict than others?
4.7.1 Multiclass Classification Results
The following three tables will present the supervised systems performance on the mul-
ticlass problem, identifying each issue as its security type. Table 4.6 shows the systems
performance when using the BF feature extraction method on each of the datasets for multi-
class classification. As seen in the two class results, just because a classifier performs well on
one dataset does not mean that it will perform well on another. When using the BF feature
extraction method, as well as the weighted average of each individual classes performance,
the Naive Bayes classifier performed the best for both IV&V Issues datasets, and k-Nearest
Neighbor performed the best on the Flight Mission Developers Issues Dataset.
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Table 4.6: Multiclass Classification Weighted Average Performance of BF Feature Vector
and all Classifiers Across All Projects
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
BF BN BF kNN BF NB BF NBM BF RF BF SVM
Precision 93.9% 94.1% 94.1% 91.1% 92.1% 92.1%
Recall 84.9% 93.9% 86.0% 91.5% 94.5% 87.0%
PFA 8.4% 33.3% 5.1% 32.8% 60.5% 46.9%
F-Score 0.892 0.940 0.899 0.913 0.933 0.895
G-Score 0.881 0.780 0.902 0.775 0.557 0.659
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
BF BN BF kNN BF NB BF NBM BF RF BF SVM
Precision 66.3% 63.3% 70.2% 65.2% 67.3% 48.0%
Recall 50.0% 63.9% 59.9% 66.8% 68.6% 35.9%
PFA 10.3% 28.8% 9.7% 34.5% 40.1% 15.7%
F-Score 0.570 0.636 0.646 0.660 0.679 0.411
G-Score 0.642 0.674 0.720 0.661 0.640 0.504
Flight Mission
Developers Issues
Supervised
System
BF BN BF kNN BF NB BF NBM BF RF BF SVM
Precision 12.9% 30.7% 41.8% 44.0% 44.7% 26.9%
Recall 33.8% 98.5% 44.8% 47.2% 48.7% 6.3%
PFA 33.4% 29.9% 18.7% 25.2% 23.5% 5.4%
F-Score 0.187 0.468 0.432 0.455 0.466 0.102
G-Score 0.448 0.819 0.578 0.579 0.595 0.118
Table 4.7 shows the systems performance when using the TF feature extraction method
on each of the datasets for multiclass classification. As shown in the two class results, just
because a classifier performs well on one dataset does not mean that it will perform well on
another. When using the TF feature extraction method, along with the weighted average
of each individual class’s performance, the Naive Bayes classifier performed the best for the
Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset, and the Naive Bayes Multinomial classifier performed
the best for both of the Flight Mission datasets.
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Table 4.7: Multiclass Classification Weighted Average Performance of TF Feature Vector
and all Classifiers Across All Projects
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
TF BN TF kNN TF NB TF NBM TF RF TF SVM
Precision 93.8% 92.5% 92.5% 94.5% 91.9% 90.9%
Recall 85.2% 92.0% 80.8% 88.9% 94.3% 92.3%
PFA 9.1% 37.4% 2.7% 14.7% 62.5% 65.2%
F-Score 0.893 0.922 0.863 0.916 0.931 0.916
G-Score 0.880 0.745 0.883 0.871 0.537 0.505
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
TF BN TF kNN TF NB TF NBM TF RF TF SVM
Precision 66.1% 67.1% 63.9% 69.5% 66.1% 56.5%
Recall 48.4% 51.8% 59.9% 67.3% 68.3% 46.3%
PFA 10.3% 21.7% 5.6% 17.9% 39.5% 19.4%
F-Score 0.559 0.585 0.618 0.684 0.672 0.509
G-Score 0.629 0.624 0.733 0.740 0.642 0.588
Flight Mission
Developers Issues
Supervised
System
TF BN TF kNN TF NB TF NBM TF RF TF SVM
Precision 12.6% 23.5% 36.7% 39.3% 41.9% 28.7%
Recall 33.3% 37.2% 33.1% 46.7% 46.1% 13.0%
PFA 33.4% 31.2% 15.0% 23.4% 24.7% 8.3%
F-Score 0.183 0.288 0.348 0.427 0.439 0.179
G-Score 0.444 0.483 0.476 0.580 0.572 0.228
Table 4.8 shows the systems performance when using the TF-IDF feature extraction
method on each of the datasets for multiclass classification. This table again shows that just
because a classifier performs well on one dataset does not imply that it will perfor well on
anther. Again, this table shows the best performing classifier being different for each dataset.
When using the TF-IDF feature extraction method, along with the weighted average of each
individual class’s performance, a Bayesian Network performed best for the Ground Mission
IV&V Issues dataset, the Naive Bayes classifier performed the best for the Flight Mission
IV&V Issues dataset, and the Random Forest classifier performed the best for the Flight
Mission Developers Issues dataset.
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Table 4.8: Multiclass Classification Weighted Average Performance of TF-IDF Feature Vec-
tor and all Classifiers Across All Projects
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
TFIDF BN TFIDF kNN TFIDF NB TFIDF NBM TFIDF RF TFIDF SVM
Precision 94.1% 92.6% 93.1% 85.3% 91.0% 92.5%
Recall 85.5% 93.1% 76.8% 92.4% 94.0% 43.7%
PFA 9.0% 42.2% 11.8% 92.4% 67.3% 7.8%
F-Score 0.896 0.928 0.842 0.887 0.925 0.594
G-Score 0.882 0.713 0.821 0.140 0.485 0.593
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
TFIDF BN TFIDF kNN TFIDF NB TFIDF NBM TFIDF RF TFIDF SVM
Precision 67.5% 66.8% 65.7% 34.7% 69.9% 64.7%
Recall 50.5% 47.1% 63.6% 85.9% 68.8% 31.7%
PFA 9.9% 11.6% 19.2% 58.9% 7.2% 5.3%
F-Score 0.578 0.552 0.646 0.494 0.693 0.426
G-Score 0.647 0.615 0.712 0.556 0.790 0.475
Flight Mission
Developers Issues
Supervised
System
TFIDF BN TFIDF kNN TFIDF NB TFIDF NBM TFIDF RF TFIDF SVM
Precision 13.4% 31.8% 33.4% 49.2% 43.7% 28.8%
Recall 33.8% 35.7% 31.2% 40.9% 46.7% 10.8%
PFA 32.7% 31.2% 5.4% 29.3% 24.7% 7.0%
F-Score 0.192 0.336 0.323 0.447 0.452 0.157
G-Score 0.450 0.470 0.469 0.518 0.576 0.194
The previous three tables have detailed the supervised systems performance on the mul-
ticlass problem (each issue as its corresponding security type), based on the weighted average
of the performance metrics for each individual classes. The following three tables show the
supervised systems performance on the multiclass problem, but using the macro-averaged
performance metrics of each individual classes. Table 4.9 shows the systems macro-averaged
performance when using the BF feature extraction method on each of the datasets for mul-
ticlass classification. Consistently with all other results presented thus far, just because a
classifier performs well on one dataset does not mean that it will perform well on another.
When using the BF feature extraction method and macro-averaged performance metrics for
multiclass classification, the best performing classifier for the Ground Mission IV&V Issues
dataset was a Bayesian Network, the best performing classifier for both Flight Missions was
Naive Bayes.
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Table 4.9: Multiclass Classification Macro-Averaged Performance of BF Feature Vector and
all Classifiers Across All Projects
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
BF BN BF kNN BF NB BF NBM BF RF BF SVM
Accuracy 84.9% 84.9% 86.0% 91.5% 94.5% 87.0%
Precision 15.5% 21.9% 54.7% 10.4% 33.3% 24.6%
Recall 26.1% 15.1% 35.6% 14.0% 20.5% 18.2%
PFA 1.8% 4.6% 1.5% 3.2% 5.1% 4.6%
F-Score 0.194 0.179 0.431 0.119 0.254 0.209
G-Score 0.41 0.261 0.523 0.245 0.337 0.306
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
BF BN BF kNN BF NB BF NBM BF RF BF SVM
Accuracy 50.0% 63.9% 59.9% 66.8% 68.6% 35.9%
Precision 25.2% 28.8% 31.1% 38.6% 39.0% 12.6%
Recall 27.1% 28.1% 35.3% 24.0% 25.7% 18.2%
PFA 6.0% 6.5% 5.0% 6.8% 7.2% 8.0%
F-Score 0.261 0.284 0.331 0.296 0.310 0.149
G-Score 0.421 0.432 0.515 0.382 0.403 0.304
Flight Mission
Developers Issues
Supervised
System
BF BN BF kNN BF NB BF NBM BF RF BF SVM
Accuracy 33.8% 38.5% 44.8% 47.2% 48.7% 6.3%
Precision 3.4% 7.4% 20.6% 15.7% 21.4% 7.4%
Recall 6.7% 7.5% 17.1% 11.8% 13.5% 8.0%
PFA 6.2% 5.7% 4.6% 4.9% 4.7% 6.2%
F-Score 0.045 0.074 0.187 0.135 0.166 0.077
G-Score 0.125 0.139 0.290 0.210 0.236 0.147
Table 4.10 shows the systems macro-averaged performance when using the TF feature
extraction method on each of the datasets for multiclass classification. Consistently with all
other results presented thus far, just because a classifier performs well on one dataset does not
mean that it will perform well on another. This table shows the same classifier performing
the best across all datasets, which has not yet been observed. The best performing classifier
for all datasets was Naive Bayes.
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Table 4.10: Multiclass Classification Macro-Averaged Performance of TF Feature Vector and
all Classifiers Across All Projects
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
TF BN TF kNN TF NB TF NBM TF RF TF SVM
Accuracy 85.2% 92.0% 80.8% 88.9% 94.3% 92.3%
Precision 15.5% 27.0% 15.3% 33.3% 34.1% 30.5%
Recall 26.8% 25.8% 35.3% 21.2% 19.4% 18.3%
PFA 1.9% 3.5% 2.7% 2.0% 5.2% 5.6%
F-Score 0.196 0.264 0.213 0.259 0.247 0.229
G-Score 0.421 0.407 0.518 0.349 0.322 0.307
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
TF BN TF kNN TF NB TF NBM TF RF TF SVM
Accuracy 48.4% 51.8% 59.9% 67.3% 68.3% 46.3%
Precision 24.1% 31.2% 32.4% 42.0% 37.9% 25.2%
Recall 25.5% 23.2% 34.6% 31.8% 24.9% 22.9%
PFA 6.2% 7.0% 5.6% 5.1% 7.1% 7.3%
F-Score 0.248 0.266 0.335 0.362 0.301 0.240
G-Score 0.401 0.371 0.506 0.476 0.393 0.367
Flight Mission
Developers Issues
Supervised
System
TF BN TF kNN TF NB TF NBM TF RF TF SVM
Accuracy 33.3% 37.2% 33.1% 46.7% 46.1% 13.0%
Precision 3.2% 4.8% 13.3% 13.1% 20.6% 8.6%
Recall 6.6% 7.1% 14.7% 12.4% 13.0% 10.4%
PFA 6.3% 5.9% 5.1% 4.8% 4.9% 6.0%
F-Score 0.043 0.057 0.140 0.127 0.159 0.094
G-Score 0.123 0.132 0.255 0.219 0.229 0.187
Table 4.11 shows the systems macro-averaged performance when using the TF-IDF fea-
ture extraction method on each of the datasets for multiclass classification. Consistently with
all other results presented thus far, just because a classifier performs well on one dataset does
not mean that it will perform well on another. Just as with Table 4.10, Table 4.11 shows the
same classifier performing the best across all datasets, which also happens to be the same
classifier. The best performing classifier for all datasets was Naive Bayes.
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Table 4.11: Multiclass Classification Macro-Averaged Performance of TF-IDF Feature Vector
and all Classifiers Across All Projects
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
TFIDF BN TFIDF kNN TFIDF NB TFIDF NBM TFIDF RF TFIDF SVM
Accuracy 85.5% 93.2% 76.8% 92.4% 94.0% 43.7%
Precision 16.6% 30.0% 18.0% 7.1% 26.5% 11.9%
Recall 26.2% 26.9% 32.6% 7.7% 17.3% 20.4%
PFA 1.8% 3.8% 2.7% 7.7% 5.6% 4.9%
F-Score 0.203 0.284 0.232 0.074 0.209 0.150
G-Score 0.414 0.420 0.488 0.142 0.292 0.336
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
Supervised
System
TFIDF BN TFIDF kNN TFIDF NB TFIDF NBM TFIDF RF TFIDF SVM
Accuracy 50.5% 47.1% 63.6% 58.9% 68.8% 31.7%
Precision 25.8% 25.1% 32.7% 5.9% 41.0% 24.5%
Recall 26.3% 24.5% 31.5% 10.0% 25.1% 24.6%
PFA 5.9% 6.4% 5.6% 10.0% 7.2% 7.4%
F-Score 0.260 0.248 0.321 0.074 0.311 0.245
G-Score 0.411 0.388 0.472 0.180 0.395 0.389
Flight Mission
Developers Issues
Supervised
System
TFIDF BN TFIDF kNN TFIDF NB TFIDF NBM TFIDF RF TFIDF SVM
Accuracy 33.8% 35.7% 31.2% 40.9% 46.7% 10.8%
Precision 3.9% 12.2% 13.2% 18.1% 21.2% 11.4%
Recall 7.4% 7.2% 14.9% 8.3% 1.3% 7.7%
PFA 6.2% 6.0% 5.4% 5.5% 4.9% 6.0%
F-Score 0.051 0.091 0.140 0.114 0.024 0.092
G-Score 0.137 0.134 0.257 0.153 0.025 0.142
Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show heatmaps corresponding to a typical confusion matrix for
each dataset. The density of each cell is represented by shades of grey and represents the
percentage of each true class assigned to each predicted class. The main diagonal corresponds
to correct classification assignments, and therefore a good assignment would consist of dark
squares along the diagonal, and white everywhere else. Furthermore, a dark vertical line
would represent everything being classified into a single class, and therefore poor system
performance.
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Figure 4.1: Multiclass Classification Heatmap of Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset using
TF NB
Figure 4.1 shows five columns with multiple dark squares in them. This corresponds to
a large portion of bug reports being classified as the classes corresponding to those columns.
These highly assigned classes are “Not Security Related,” “Memory Management,” “Risky
Values,” “Resource Management,” and “Predictability.” Interestingly enough, all of these
highly assigned classes are the largest classes found in each dataset, with the exception of
“Predictability.” The best performing classes are “Not Security Related,” “Memory Access,”
“Risky Values,” “Resource Management,” and “Unused Entities.” These are noted as best
performing due to the dark squares along the diagonal, representing the majority of all issues
that belong to those classes actually being assigned to those classes.
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Figure 4.2: Multiclass Classification Heatmap of Flight Mission IV&V Issues dataset using
TF NB
For the same reasoning as described for Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 shows the majority of all
issues were assigned to “Memory Access,” “Not Security Related,” and “Risky Values.” The
best performing classes were “Memory Access,” “Not Security Related,” “Unused Entities,”
and “Other.”
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Figure 4.3: Multiclass Classification Heatmap of Flight Mission Developers Issues dataset
using TF NB
For the same reasoning as described for Figure 4.1, Figure 4.3 shows the majority of all
issues were assigned to “Not Security Related,” “Memory Access,” and “Risky Values.” The
best performing classes were “Memory Access” and “Risky Values.”
4.7.2 Multiclass Classification Observations
All performance metrics were presented macro-averaged as well as weighted averaged.
The difference in these can be summarized as the macro-average detailing the classification
performance with respect to each class, no matter the size of the class, whereas the weighted
average details the classification performance with respect to the majority of the issues.
All classifiers performed well with respect to the weighted average except for SVM, which
significantly underperformed other classifiers in several cases. With respect to the macro-
averages however, Naive Bayes outperformed all classifiers in all situations.
The best performing security classes most likely perform well because they contain class
specific, well known terminology. The class of “Memory Access” (one of the best performing
classes) revolves around problems with pointers and buffers. These are well known and
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commonly used terms. However, a class such as “Synchronization” is more centered around
the order and process in which things occur; such a class has little class specific terminology
that is not as well known as something such as ‘pointer,’ and therefore is more difficult to
accurately predict.
4.8 Unsupervised One-Class Problem
The previous section (Section 4.5) defined the process in which supervised systems are
trained and tested. Supervised systems rely heavily on labeled data as defined in the defi-
nition of supervised learning, and shown in the previous section. An enormous amount of
time and effort is needed to manually label each issue (or a significant portion of all issues)
properly for use in any of the aforementioned systems. Furthermore, there is a very high
likelihood that not all classes (especially in the case of multiclass classification) will be am-
ply defined, or even present in the training set. Obviously, if a class is never defined to a
classifier, it is impossible for that classifier to correctly classify an issue of the never defined
class. The results shown multiple times throughout Chapter 3 proves that this situation
exists for every project analyzed.
In order to avoid this time consuming and costly requirement of manual labeling as well
as guarantee that all classes have been properly defined and amply presented to a classifier,
this section presents a distance metric based approach to classifying issues. The CWE-888
view defined in Section 3.2 was used to define the security type of each issue during labeling
as defined in Section 3.3. Furthermore, all CWE’s in the CWE-888 view (from here on out
referred to as the CWE-888 data) describe the features of each class, and can be used for
one-class classification.
This approach is one of anomaly detection. Anomaly detection refers to the problem of
finding patterns in data that deviate from a normal [43]. The CWE-888 data was used to
define this normal. Specifically, each CWE in the CWE-888 view was processed just as each
issue was in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, which put this data in the same form as the documents in
the corpora. The definition of the normal will be covered in Section 4.8.2.
Now that the data is in a format consistent with the documents (issues), the cosine
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similarity distance measure can be used to determine if a document conforms to the normal
or not. The cosine similarity and Euclidean distance simply measures the distance (angle)
between the normal and the document, and if the distance is greater than a threshold then the
issue is said to deviate from the normal, otherwise it does not. Using the Euclidean distance
in this sense is essentially an application of the kNN algorithm, with the only difference
being that each instance is classified based on its distance from a specified neighbor. The
selection of this threshold will be discussed in Section 4.8.1. This section addresses research
question 4:
4. Can unsupervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify software issues as
security related or not?
4.8.1 Defining a Threshold
In many cases, defining a threshold is more of an art than a scientific method. However,
[57] described a method which was employed in this work. The threshold was selected using
the following steps:
1. Separate the data into three sets: training, validation, and testing
2. Test a wide range of thresholds on the validation data
3. Select the threshold which gives the best performance on the validation data, for use
on the testing data
As mentioned in the first step, three subsets of data are needed. The training data will be
the CWE-888 data, however the testing and validation data must originate from the corpora.
Therefore, each corpus was separated into two subsets using 2-fold cross-validation, where
one fold was used as the validation set, and the remaining as the testing set. Furthermore,
we selected the G-Score as the metric to base the selection of the threshold on as maximizing
either the recall or probability of false alarm could easily lead to everything being classified
to a single class. The G-Score incorporates both the recall and probability of false alarm
into one metric, and because the recall and probability of false alarm are the metrics we are
attempting to maximize, the G-Score was the obvious choice.
Jacob P. Tyo Chapter 4. Automated Bug Report Classification 75
4.8.2 One-Class Classification
Using the approach mentioned in Section 4.8, the CWE-888 data was defined as the
normal. Following this, the corpus for each dataset was separated into a validation and a
testing set using 2-fold stratified cross validation. The cosine similarity was used to quantify
the distance between each validation document and the normal. A wide range of thresholds
were tested, and the one maximizing the performance on the validation dataset was chosen.
The cosine similarity is then used in combination with the selected threshold to classify
the testing data, with a document conforming to the normal being security related, and a
document not conforming to the normal being non-security related.
4.8.3 Unsupervised Classification Results
This section details the results obtained from the methodology described in Section 4.8.2.
The performance of all systems using BF feature extraction and TF feature extraction have
been very similar thus far. The one-class problem was only run with the TF and TF-IDF
feature extraction methods. Figure 4.12 shows the one-class performance across all datasets
using cosine similarity. The best performance among each metric is shown in bold, and
the threshold selected from a validation set is also shown for each test. The highest G-
Score obtained using the TF-IDF feature extraction method in combination with the cosine
similarity distance metric was on the Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset. Although this
method does not perform as well as the best supervised methods, it obtains results very
similar to what is seen among the supervised classifiers.
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Table 4.12: One-Class Performance Across All Projects using Cosine Similarity
Dataset
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
Flight Mission
Developers Issues
Feature Extraction
Method
TF TF-IDF TF TF-IDF TF TF-IDF
Selected Threshold 0.286 0.263 0.216 0.235 0.260 0.220
Accuracy 64.3% 73.0% 67.8% 49.2% 55.4% 51.7%
Precision 15.0% 17.7% 58.1% 41.2% 69.3% 65.9%
Recall 78.7% 69.9% 77.7% 55.4% 57.9% 55.1%
PFA 36.9% 26.7% 39.1% 55.1% 49.4% 54.9%
F-Score 0.252 0.283 0.665 0.473 0.631 0.600
G-Score 0.700 0.715 0.683 0.496 0.540 0.496
Table 4.13 shows the systems performance when using the Euclidean distance as the
distance measure for the one-class problem. The best performance among each metric is
shown in bold, and the threshold selected from a validation set is also shown for each test.
The highest G-Score obtained using the TF-IDF feature vector in combination with the
Euclidean distance metric was on the Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset. Although this
method does not perform as well as the best supervised methods, it obtains results very
similar to what is seen among the supervised classifiers.
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Table 4.13: One-Class Performance Across All Projects using Euclidean Distance
Dataset
Ground Mission
IV&V Issues
Flight Mission
IV&V Issues
Flight Mission
Developer Issues
Feature Extraction
Method
TF TF-IDF TF TF-IDF TF TF-IDF
Selected Threshold 8.000 1.214 8.770 1.237 6.708 1.248
Accuracy 68.3% 73.0% 66.0% 49.0% 51.1% 51.5%
Precision 10.4% 17.8% 60.0% 41.0% 66.9% 65.8%
Recall 41.2% 69.9% 51.6% 54.8% 50.8% 54.8%
PFA 29.4% 26.7% 24.0% 55.1% 48.4% 54.8%
F-Score 0.166 0.283 0.555 0.469 0.578 0.598
G-Score 0.520 0.715 0.615 0.493 0.512 0.495
Interestingly, the results in Table 4.13 for the classification of the Ground Mission IV&V
Issues dataset using the TF-IDF feature vector was exactly the same as the results seen
in Table 4.12. The difference in performance between the cosine similarity and Euclidean
distance metric are marginal elsewhere as well. The only case where the G-Score differs by
more than 0.07 is in the case of the Ground Mission IV&V Issues dataset and the TF feature
vector, where the cosine similarity obtained a G-Score of 0.700 and the Euclidean distance
obtained a G-Score of 0.520.
4.8.4 Unsupervised Observations and Comparisons with Super-
vised Techniques
The difference in the classification performance between the cosine similarity and the
euclidean distance were marginal. The cosine similarity thresholds did not very significantly
across different datasets or different feature vectors, however the thresholds used for the
euclidean distance varied significantly across feature vectors, but not across datasets. In
all cases, the cosine similarity distance measure obtained equal or higher recalls than the
euclidean distance, but the Euclidean distance obtained an equal or better probability of
false alarm than the cosine similarity. Furthermore, the F-Score was equal between the two
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distance metrics, or higher for the cosine similarity in all cases.
The best unsupervised classification results (G-Score of 0.715) were not as good as the
best supervised classification results (G-Score of 0.903), however, the best unsupervised
classification results are comparable to the average supervised classification results. Although
these two methods are comparable, in general the supervised classifiers outperformed the
unsupervised classifiers on all performance metrics.
4.9 Threats to Validity
Many issues arose during the automated classification of bug reports. Some instances
arose when an issue could be correctly classified into multiple CWE-888 classes, and therefore
could generate two correct results. This has no clear solution and was solved in the case of
manual labeling by selecting the most relevant of the possible classes, which possibly could
be counting an assigned issue as incorrect, when in fact the classification was accurate. This
could have a significant negative impact on the results to the automated classification with
regards to multiclass classification.
Each dataset contained a small amount (15% or less) if issues that did not contain
sufficient information for classification. The assumption was made that due to the low level
of information included in the issue, more information must be provided before the issue
is solved. This would lead to either an analyst or developer looking further into the issue
and providing more detail, or another issue being opened entirely which more accurately
and completely describes the issue. Because of this, an issue which did not contain the
information necessary for classification was labeled as “Not Security Related,” and most
likely does not affect the automated classification significantly.
A troubling factor faced throughout the automated classification was the amount of noise
contained within each issue. Remembering that the purpose of a bug tracking system is to
detail issues with the system, the vast majority of issues are focused on finding, describing,
and fixing a bug. Therefore, the security impact or traits of an issue are most often a small
detail within each issue, or not even present. When using traditional feature extraction
methods, the most often goal of the following classification is to detect the topic of the
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document under concern; however in this case, the goal is to ascertain the security relevance
of the issue instead of the topic. Because of this, each feature vector contained a significant
amount of noise, often with only a very few terms (as small as one) relating to the security
aspect. The attempt of solving this in this work was using the vocabulary extracted from the
CWE-888 list, however more delicate solutions could lead to significantly better performance.
Another influencing factor is the terminology used. If the data being classified used
terminology to denote security issues that does not exist in the CWE list, then those terms
are not being extracted, and therefore can have no effect on the classification. Although this
could not be verified, after the manual classification of each issue in Chapter 3, this did not
appear to be the case.
Quantifying the performance of any classification system is a difficult task, as many
different performance metrics exist which all bring unique benefits and costs. This thesis
utilized the G-Score as the main classification method as it is able to quantify the recall and
probability of false alarm in a single number, as well as includes many other performance
metrics in an attempt to provide the entire picture of the performance of the system. This
however, is also complicated for multiclass classification, due to the difference in macro-
averaging and the weighted averages of each performance metric. To help avoid experimental
bias in this regard, many performance metrics were provided.
Arguably the largest threat to validity is the quality of the provided data. While these
NASA bug tracking systems are well maintained, our work attempts to leverage this issue
tracking data in a way in which it was not originally meant to be used. Therefore, sufficient
information to perform the tasks at hand may not be provided, but other secondary patterns
may be used by the classifiers in an attempt to make sinse of, and classify each issue. Whether
each issue has sufficient information regarding the security implication of an issue depends
on the security knowledge of the developer or analyst entering the issue into the system.
4.10 Automated Classification Conclusion
Table 4.14 presents a comparison between this project and related works. The first row
in this table represents the work presented in this thesis, whereas each of the other rows
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represent a related work.
Table 4.14: Comparison with Related Works
Comparison with Related Work
Paper Purpose Dataset
Feature
Vectors
Classifiers
Performance
Metrics
Best Performance
This
work
Separate bugs into security
categories
NASA
TF, TF-
IDF,
Binary Bag
of Words
Cosine Similarity,
Naive Bayes, Naive
Bayes Multinomial,
Random Forest, k-
Nearest Neighbor,
Support Vector Ma-
chine, Bayes Net
Precision,
Accuracy,
Recall,
Probability
of False
Alarm,
F-Score,
G-Score
Precision up to 94%,
Recall up to 96%, F-
Score up to 85%, G-
Score up to 90%
[4]
Separate bugs based on secu-
rity impact
“the
Bugzilla
repository
of bug
reports”
TF-IDF
“ector space model”,
Naive Bayes
Accuracy
and Preci-
sion
Success Rate: 95.69,
Precision Rate: 93.19
[5]
Identify Security issues within
an issue tracking system (HIB
- Hidden Impact Bugs)
Redhat and
Linux Ker-
nel
TF
NB, NBM, Decision
Tree
TP Rate
(precision),
Bayesian
Detection
(recall)
Bayesian Detection
Rate: 0.4, TP Rate:
0.28, TN Rate: 0.99
[6]
Identify security bug reports
which were mislabeled as non
security bug reports
Cisco
Projects
TF SVM
Accuracy,
Precision,
Recall
Accuracy of .87, pre-
cision of .85, and re-
call of .88; however this
was compared to the
output from the static
code analysis tool For-
tify
[7]
Find security issues which were
misclassified as non-security
MySQL
Set known
strings to
risk values
Get total risk of an
issue from feature ex-
traction and calculate
which are security
problems
N/A
Claim a 657 to 772%
increase in the num-
ber of vulnerabilities
for the MySQL project.
[8]
Classify and categorize vulner-
abilities according to their se-
curity types
Firefox
CVSS
Scores
Bayesian Net N/A N/A
[21]
Determine which components
of a project are likely to con-
tain vulnerabilities
20 Android
Applica-
tions
TF
Naive Bayes or Ran-
dom Forest
Precision,
Recall
Precision with Naive
Bayes: 0.62 - 1, Recall
with Naive Bayes: .32-
.92, Precision with ran-
dom Forest: .59-1, Re-
call of Random Forest:
.24-1
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[24]
Determine if bug is a dupli-
cate of one already in the issue
tracking system
Mozilla
Project
TF + cus-
tom term
weighting
Cosine Similarity N/A
8% of duplicate bug re-
ports were filtered out
[25] Predict the severity of bug
Eclypse
and
GNOME
TF-IDF
Naive Bayes, Naive
Bayes Multinomial,
K-Nearest Neigh-
bor, Support Vector
Machine
ROC
Area under ROC curve
of 0.93
[26]
Classify each bug into correc-
tive maintenance or other kind
of activity
Eclipse,
Mozilla,
JBoss
TF
Naive Bayes, Logistic
Regression, Alternate
Decision Trees
Precision,
Recall
Precision between .64
and .98, Recall be-
tween .33 and .97, cor-
rect decision rate from
.39 to .82
[27]
Classify issue as bug or request
using fuzzy logic
HTTPClient,
Jackrabbit,
Lucene
Membership
score based
on term
frequency
Fuzzy Logic
Precision,
Recall,
Accuracy,
F-Measure
accuracies, marginally
better than other clas-
sification methods
[28]
Automatic prediction of differ-
ent bug types using KNN and
Naive bayes.
FIT 4 -
Multiple
Tele-
com and
Banking
projects
TF
Naive Bayes and k-
Nearest Neighbor
Precision,
Recall
Recall from .72 to .91,
Precision from .73 to
.79
[29]
Automatically route bugs to
the appropriate developer for
solution
Eclipse
Mylyn,
Mozilla
TF-IDF,
LDA
SVM, KL
Recall, Di-
vergence
Recall similar to those
found previously, with
better consistency
This chapter addressed the following research questions:
2. Can supervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify software issues as
security related or not?
a) Do some learners perform consistently better than others?
b) How much data must be set aside for training in order to produce accurate clas-
sification results?
3. Can supervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify security issues to spe-
cific security classes?
a) Are some classes harder to predict than others?
4. Can unsupervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify software issues as
security related or not?
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5. How does the performance of supervised and unsupervised machine learning algorithms
compare when classifying software bug reports?
Can supervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify software issues as security
related or not? This work has shown that accurate classification results can be obtained using
multiple feature extraction methods, and multiple classifiers on each of the datasets. The
level of performance however, does depend on the dataset. A G-Score of 0.903 was obtained
on the best performing dataset, whereas the worst performing dataset achieved a G-Score of
only 0.653.
Do some learners perform consistently better than others? The results showed that this
is the case, but in a very unpredictable manor. Some learners do better than others, but the
best performing classifier was different depending not only on the feature extraction method,
but also on the dataset. In general however, the Naive Bayes classifier was consistently among
the best performers.
How much data must be set aside for training in order to produce accurate classification
results? This research has shown that the systems performance using only 25% of the data
for training a Naive Bayes classifier is just as effective as using 10-fold cross validation.
Can supervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify security issues to specific
security classes? The macro-averaged performance metrics were used to evaluate the multi-
class performance, and accurate classification results were achieved for some of the classes.
A larger sample size could possibly improve these results, as several classes had a very small
number of instances (less than 3). Furthermore, the dataset quality continued to effect the
classification results, with the same datasets performing best for the two-class classification
performing best for the multiclass classification.
Are some classes harder to predict than others? Most classes are hard to detect. However,
the dominating classes for each dataset were the best performing classes for each correspond-
ing dataset. This could imply that not enough data is provided for the under performing
classes. A more likely explanation however is that the best performing security classes most
likely perform well because they contain class specific, well known terminology. The class of
“Memory Access” (one of the best performing classes) revolves around problems with point-
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ers and buffers. These are well known and commonly used terms. However, a class such
as “Synchronization” is more centered around the order and process in which things occur;
such a class has little class specific terminology that is not as well known as something such
as ‘pointer,’ and therefore is more difficult to accurately predict.
Can unsupervised machine learning algorithms be used to classify software issues as
security related or not? Incorporating the CWE list into an anomaly detection problem
allowed for exactly this. The CWE list can be used in conjunction with unsupervised machine
learning algorithms to classify software issues as security related or not with performance
comparable to supervised methods. The best unsupervised classification results (G-Score
of 0.715) were not as good as the best supervised classification results (G-Score of 0.903),
however, the best unsupervised classification results are comparable to the average supervised
classification results.
How does the performance of supervised and unsupervised machine learning algorithms
compare when classifying software bug reports? In most cases, supervised machine learning
algorithms perform better than unsupervised; however the best performing unsupervised
method’s performance is comparable to the supervised methods. Although these two meth-
ods are comparable, in general the supervised classifiers outperformed the unsupervised
classifiers on all performance metrics.
84
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis had two main research goals: (1) to explore the distribution and characteristics
of security vulnerabilities based on the information provided in bug tracking systems and (2)
to develop data analytics approaches for automatic classification of bug reports as security or
non-security related. A vulnerability profile was created for three NASA datasets, showing
the prominent vulnerability types as well as how those vulnerabilities trend across projects
and mission types. Common supervised machine learning algorithms, as well as a novel
unsupervised machine learning approach were used to classify vulnerabilities as security or
non-security related.
The vulnerability profile revealed that the majority of software vulnerabilities belong
only to a small number of types. Specifically, 87% or more of all issues in the analyzed
projects fall under the vulnerability type of “Exception Management,” “Memory Access,”
“Other,” “Risky Values,” or “Unused Entities.”
The supervised classifiers of Naive Bayes, Naive Bayes Multinomial, Bayesian Network,
k-Nearest Neighbor, Random Forest, and Support Vector Machine were used to distinguish
between security and non-security bug reports as a two class problem. Furthermore, each
of these classifiers was tested in combination with three feature extraction methods: Binary
Bag-of-Words, Term Frequency, and Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency. The
classification performance of each dataset depended upon the feature vector and classifier
used, bug no significant performance difference was seen between feature vectors. The per-
formance of each classifier varied greatly between datasets, however, the Naive Bayes and
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SVM classifiers were always among the best performing. All other classifiers performed very
poorly on at least one dataset. The Naive Bayes classifier coupled with the Binary Bag-of-
Words feature vector was shown to achieve the same level of performance when using only
25% of the data to train on, as when using 10-fold cross validation.
The classifiers and feature vectors mentioned in the previous paragraph were also eval-
uated on their ability to differentiate between different security types. This performance
was evaluated using both the macro-averaged performance metrics as well as the weighted
averaged performance metrics. The weighted averaged performance metrics weighted each
class with respect to how many issues it contained, with larger classes carrying more weight.
With respect to these performance metrics, the best performing classifiers were very similar
to the best performing classifiers of the two-class problem. The macro-averaged performance
metrics placed equal weight on every class, which significantly changed the performance met-
rics as several classes with very few (5 or less) instances exist in all datasets. With respect to
the macro-averaged performance metrics, the Naive Bayes classifier out performed all other
classifiers in all cases. While many classes did not perform well, the best performing classes
seemed to be those with commonly known, class specific terminology.
In an attempt to not only remove the manual labeling constraint of the supervised learn-
ing approach, but to also ensure a complete definition of security types, a novel unsupervised
machine learning approach was developed. This approach was one of anomaly detection
which used the CWE-888 data to define a normal. The cosine similarity and Euclidean
distance measures were used to determine if a bug report deviated from the normal (making
it non-security) or not (security). These distance measures achieved very similar classifica-
tion performance, with the cosine similarity narrowly outperforming the Euclidean distance.
An interesting observation however is the selected threshold for the cosine similarity varied
only slightly between datasets and feature vectors, where the Euclidean distance threshold
changed drastically depending on the feature vector. While this approach performed well, it
was not as effective as the supervised method, achieving a G-Score of only 0.715 where the
best supervised approach achieved a G-Score of 0.903.
To explore the generalizability of vulnerability profiles, open source empirical studies
should be performed. This could easily be performed on bug tracking systems such as
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those made available by RedHat or MySQL. Furthermore, the vulnerability profile could be
automated for any issue tracking system in which the issues are labeled with a corresponding
CWE-888 tag, or a tag that could be easily linked to the CWE-888 classification schema.
An interesting alternative route for this project would be utilizing a custom built neural
network for both the feature extraction and classification. This could be done by creating
either a convoluted or recurrent neural network which would convolve over the text and
output the class. The class could be either security related or not security related, or could
even be expanded to do multiclass classification with the CWE-888 structure. This could be
a good approach because often times as seen in this project, automated classification is hard
due to the high level of noise, and therefore the feature extraction is of utmost importance.
A properly built and sufficiently large neural network would have the opportunity to perform
its own feature extraction, and assuming a large enough dataset could most likely become
very accurate. The size of the dataset is most likely not an issue either however due to the
large amount of open source data available.
Another, perhaps more interesting approach would be to expand the anomaly detection
to a multiclass problem. This could be done by treating each class of the multiclass problem
as a one-class anomaly detection problem. Then select a threshold for each class with a
validation set as described in Section 4.8.1. Then when classifying the testing set, run the
test data against all classes as a one-class anomaly detection problem (as was done in this
work), and if the issue falls under the threshold for any class, assign that issue to that class.
In the even that an issue falls under multiple classes, then select the class in which the issue
falls under the threshold by the most significant amount. This would most likely be done by
dividing the similarity assigned by the distance metric by the threshold, and assigning the
issue to the class in which this number is the lowest.
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Appendix A
CWE-888 Overview
Table A.1: CWE-888 Overview
CWE-888: Software Fault Pattern Overview
Primary Secondary
# of
CWEs
Primary
CWE
Totals
Pattern &
Condition
Available?
Discernible
CWEs
SFP #
Risky Values 31
Glitch in Computa-
tion
31 partial 27 SFP1
Unused Entities 3
Unused Entities 3 yes 3 SFP2
API 28
Use of an Improper
API
28 partial 20 SFP3
Exception Man-
agement
27
Unchecked Status
Condition
17 partial 13 SFP4
Ambiguous Exception
Type
2 yes 2 SFP5
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Primary Secondary
# of
CWEs
Primary
CWE
Totals
Pattern &
Condition
Available?
Discernible
CWEs
SFP #
Incorrect Exception
Behavior
8 partial 3 SFP6
Memory Access 20
Faulty Pointer Use 3 yes 3 SFP7
Faulty Buffer Access 11 yes 11 SFP8
Faulty String Expan-
sion
2 yes 2 SFP9
Incorrect Buffer
Length Computation
3 partial 2 SFP10
Improper NULL ter-
mination
1 singular 1 SFP11
Memory Man-
agement
5
Faulty Memory Re-
lease
5 yes 5 SFP12
Resource Man-
agement
17
Unrestricted Con-
sumption
4 partial 3 SFP13
Failure to Release Re-
source
7 yes 7 SFP14
Faulty Resource Use 2 yes 2 SFP15
Life Cycle 4 no 0 -
Path Resolution 51
Path Traversal 43 partial 38 SFP16
Failed chroot Jail 1 singular 1 SFP17
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Primary Secondary
# of
CWEs
Primary
CWE
Totals
Pattern &
Condition
Available?
Discernible
CWEs
SFP #
Link in Resource
Name Resolution
7 partial 4 SFP18
Synchronization 22
Missing Lock 13 partial 10 SFP19
Race Condition Win-
dow
5 partial 4 SFP20
Multiple
Locks/Unlocks
3 yes 3 SFP21
Unrestricted Lock 1 singular 1 SFP22
Information
Leak
96
Exposed Data 76 partial 38 SFP23
State Disclosure 7 no 0 -
Exposure Through
Temporary File
3 no 0 -
Other Exposures 7 no 0 -
Insecure Session Man-
agement
3 no 0 -
Tainted Input 138
Tainted Input to
Command
87 partial 68 SFP24
Tainted Input to Vari-
able
8 yes 8 SFP25
Composite Tainted In-
put
0 no 0 SFP26
Faulty Input Transfor-
mation
15 no 0 -
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Primary Secondary
# of
CWEs
Primary
CWE
Totals
Pattern &
Condition
Available?
Discernible
CWEs
SFP #
Incorrect Input Han-
dling
17 no 0 -
Tainted Input to Envi-
ronment
11 partial 3 SFP27
Entry Points 11
Unexpected Access
Points
11 yes 11 SFP28
Authentication 43
Authentication By-
pass
10 no 0 -
Faulty Endpoint Au-
thentication
11 partial 6 SFP29
Missing Endpoint Au-
thentication
2 yes 2 SFP30
Digital Certificate 6 no 0 -
Missing Authentica-
tion
2 yes 2 SFP31
Insecure Authentica-
tion Policy
6 no 0 -
Multiple Binds to the
Same Port
1 singular 1 SFP32
Hardcoded Sensitive
Data
4 partial 2 SFP33
Unrestricted Authen-
tication
1 singular 1 SFP34
Access Control 16
Insecure Resource Ac-
cess
4 partial 2 SFP35
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Primary Secondary
# of
CWEs
Primary
CWE
Totals
Pattern &
Condition
Available?
Discernible
CWEs
SFP #
Insecure Resource
Permissions
7 no 0 -
Access Management 5 no 0 -
Privilege 12
Privilege 12 partial 1 SFP36
Channel 13
Channel Attack 8 no 0 -
Protocol Error 5 no 0 -
Cryptography 13
Broken Cryptography 5 no 0 -
Weak Cryptography 8 no 0 -
Malware 11
Malicious Code 8 no 0 -
Covert Channel 3 no 0 -
Predictability 15
Predictability 15 no 0 -
UI 14
Feature 7 no 0 -
Information Loss 4 no 0 -
Security 3 no 0 -
Other 46
Architecture 11 no 0 -
Jacob P. Tyo Appendix A: CWE-888 Overview 98
Primary Secondary
# of
CWEs
Primary
CWE
Totals
Pattern &
Condition
Available?
Discernible
CWEs
SFP #
Design 29 no 0 -
Implementation 5 no 0 -
Compiler 1 no 0 -
632 310 36
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Field Descriptions of Analyzed ITS’s
Table B.1: IV&V Issue Tracking System Field Descrip-
tions
IV&V Issue Tracking System Field Descriptions
Column Title Description Is Field Used?
Issue ID An ID is assigned to each issue and recorded in this field Yes
Project Contains the project name that the issue is from Yes
State
The current state of the issue (i.e. Closed, Submitted,
Withdrawn, etc)
Yes
Subject The subject or title of the issue Yes
Attachments N/A No
Capability
General Grouping of Functionality - A capability is
made up of several subsystems which is made up of sev-
eral software components
Yes
Comments
Updates about the progression and search for solution
of the issue
Yes
Count N/A Yes
Data Restrictions N/A Yes
Defer Date N/A No
Defer Issue N/A No
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Column Title Description Is Field Used?
Defer Notify Recipi-
ents
N/A No
Description The full description of the issue Yes
Impact
The projected or observed impact of the issue on the
system
Yes
Issue Category The category the issue falls into (i.e. Code, Design, etc.) Yes
Issue Type
The type of issue, more specific than Issue Category (i.e.
Incomplete Design, Incorrect Code, etc.)
Yes
Severity How sever the issue is Yes
Method The analysis method used to detect the issue Yes
Originator N/A Yes
Phase Found The project phase in which the issue was found Yes
Phase Introduced The project phase in which the issue was introduced Yes
Phase Resolved The project phase in which the issue was resolved No
Recommended Ac-
tions
The action that the analyst recommends taking in re-
sponse to the issue
Yes
References Any material that can be reference to support the issue Yes
Related Issues Any issues highly related to the current issue Yes
Resolution Chronol-
ogy
A history of the solution of the issue Yes
Technical Framework
Level 1
N/A Yes
Technical Framework
Level 2
N/A Yes
Technical Framework
Level 3
N/A Yes
Workaround
If issue cannot be solved, what was put in place to ac-
count for it
Yes
Defect
The defect of the issue (i.e. Software Behaviors, Re-
quirements Documentation, etc)
Yes
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Column Title Description Is Field Used?
Defect Category
The category of the defect (i.e. Design, Requirements,
etc.)
Yes
Analysis Method The method used to review the issue Yes
Element
The element that the issue originates from, similar to the
“Subsystem” in the Developer Issue Tracking System -
A subsystem is made up of several software components
Yes
Date Submitted to
POC
N/A Yes
Reqt Number N/A No
Developer ITA N/A Yes
Verification Procedure
Review
The procedure used to verify the fix of the issue Yes
Created By
The analyst or developer that entered the issue into the
issue tracking system
Yes
Created Date
The date the issue was entered into the issue tracking
system
Yes
Updated By The last analyst or developer to update the issue Yes
Updated Date The last data the issue was updated Yes
Table B.2: Developer Issue Tracking System Field De-
scriptions
Developer Issue Tracking System Field Descriptions
Column Title Description Is Field Used?
Issue ID An ID is assigned to each issue and recorded in this field Yes
DCR Product The product the DCR relates to Yes
Type The project and product of the DCR Yes
DCR Solution The actions taken to resolve the DCR Yes
DCR Severity The criticality of the DCR Yes
DCR Subtype A general category of the problem under concern Yes
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Column Title Description Is Field Used?
DCR/Test Descrip-
tion
The description of the DCR Yes
DCR Subsystem
The part of the system the DCR originates from, similar
to “Element” from the IV&V Issue Tracking System -
A subsystem is made up of several software components
Yes
DCR Type The type of DCR (i.e. Defect, Change Request, etc.)
DCR Title The title or subject of the DCR Yes
DCR Priority How urgent fixing the DCR is Yes
DCR Application The application the DCR originates from Yes
DCR Closure Notes
Points of interest detailing the solution of the DCR or
deviations from normal routine
Yes
State What lifespan stage the DCR is in Yes
DCR Date Closed
With Defect
N/A Yes
DCR Date In Test The date the DCR is ready for testing Yes
Backward Relation-
ships
Any previos DCR’s that the current is related to Yes
DCR Test Procs Used
to Verify
The procedures used to verify the DCR Yes
DCR Date On Hold
If the DCR was put on hold, the data of which this took
place
Yes
DCR Date Test Com-
pleted
The date at which the testing on the DCR was com-
pleted
Yes
DCR Date Ready For
Test
The date the DCR is ready to be tested Yes
DCR Affects FSRL N/A Yes
Attachments
Any attachments that assist with the description, test-
ing, or resolution of the DCR
Yes
DCR Date Closed The date the DCR was closed Yes
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Column Title Description Is Field Used?
Implements
Any other DCR solutions that the DCR under concern
implements
Yes
DCR Build Target N/A Yes
DCR Test Assigned
Tester
The developer assigned to test the DCR Yes
DCR Test Log Init
Files Folder
N/A Yes
Signature Comment N/A No
DCR IRB Comments N/A Yes
DCR Test Outcome Initial test results Yes
DCR Test Tester
Comments
Comments left by the testing developer Yes
DCR Date In Work Date when work starts on the DCR Yes
DCR Date Work
Completed
Date the work is finished on the DCR Yes
DCR Phase Found The development phase of which the DCR was found Yes
DCR IRB Comments
History
N/A No
DCR Workflow N/A Yes
Forward Relationships The related DCR’s created after the one under concern Yes
DCR Date Assigned The date the DCR is assigned to a dveloper Yes
DCR Test Log Init
Files
N/A Yes
DCR Document Type
The type of DCR document (i.e. requirements, algo-
rithms, etc)
Yes
Links to Tests from
DCR
The tests relevant to the DCR Yes
DCR Additional
Products Affected
Products other than the one the DCR originated from
that are effected
Yes
Modified Date The last date the DCR was modified Yes
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Column Title Description Is Field Used?
DCR Date Ready For
Closure
The date the DCR is marked as ready to close Yes
Signed By N/A No
Modified By The developers to modify the DCR Yes
DCR Test Verification How was the DCR verified Yes
DCR Date Build Inte-
gration
The date the DCR was integrated Yes
DCR/Test Leads
Comments
Project lead comments Yes
DCR Test Log Folder
Verify
N/A Yes
DCR Test Log Files
Verify
N/A Yes
Is Related To Other DCR’s the one under concern is related to Yes
DCR Assigned To The Developer the DCR was assigned to Yes
Created By The creater of the DCR Yes
DCR Build Found The build in which the DCR was found Yes
DCR Test Procs Init
Used
N/A Yes
Assumed Issue Cate-
gory
N/A No
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